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"We all live subsidized lives."
- Martha Albertson Fineman'
"[T] he habits of self-reliance and individual responsibility... are
and must be constitutive of the entire American political order."
2
-WilliamJ. Bennett &JohnJ. Dilulio, Jr.
Martha Fineman challenges us to move caretaking from the
margins to the center of society. In a recent book,3 she argued
powerfully for a vision of the family that recognizes the relationship
of caretaking-Mothering 4-as central. Her current work further
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffllo. BA-, Colby
College; J.D., Yale Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School. Email: mcclusk@buffalo.edu.
Thanks to Carl Nightingale and participants in the SUNY Buffalo faculty theory workshop for
comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Suffciency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Fineman,
Cracking the Foundational Myths].
2. What Good is Government?, 104 COMMiENTARY 25, 31 (1997).
3. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER] (criticizing the dominant focus on sexual affiliation as the legal and cultural core of
the family).
4. Fineman uses "Mothering" and the Mother/Child pair as metaphors to recognize the
gendered history and continuing gendered culture of caretaking. FINEMANI', THE NETERED
MOTHER, supra note 3, at 233-34. She intends this metaphor to be non-essentialist and non-
biological, allowing for men to be Mothers and for women to be non-Mothers. Id. at 234-35.
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develops that analysis by explaining how caretaking also should be
recognized and rewarded as central to the market and the state.
6
This vision reveals and reshapes the interrelationships between the
three basic institutions of state, market, and family.
In the dominant "liberal" theory of politics and economics,
autonomy is the key to both a free state and a free market;
7
dependency is relegated to the family.8 By probing this founding
myth, Fineman strikes a fault line: globally and locally, the
institutions of state, family, and market are undergoing a dramatic
shift. This shift, however, is moving the family and its caretaking
labor further toward the margins of the market and state. Fineman's
vision challenges us to reverse the direction of this shift at a critical-
and critically difficult-moment.
Fineman directly defies what many see as the unavoidable demise
of the welfare state.9 A new political consensus claims to endorse
"individual responsibility, as opposed to social responsibility, for
societal problems."'" This is a time of strong political movement away
from collective responsibility for caretaking.
5. Fineman chooses the term "caretaking" over "caregiving" to counter the assumption
that this labor should be a "gift." FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 3, at 234.
6. See Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 14-15 (arguing for a
theory of collective responsibility for dependency).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD ASHCRAFr, LOCKE'S TWO TREAnSES OF GOVERNMENT 102 (1987)
(explaining that the assumption that individuals have the "freedom to order their [own]
actions" is the foundation of Locke's theory of political liberty); JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM 60-61
(1986) (describing the liberal view that "[a] free man is one who possesses the rights and
privileges needed for him to act autonomously,--to rule himself, and not be ruled by another").
Here, "liberal" refers to liberal political theory, which grounds both "liberals" and
.conservatives" in contemporary U.S. politics. See infra note 16 (noting different usages of the
term "liberal").
8. See ASHCRAFr, supra note 7, at 109-11 (stating that Locke conceives the family as a pre-
natural, pre-political institution in which people act not individualistically, but for the mutual
benefit of others); FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 3, at 17-18.
9. See, e.g., Thomas J. Duesterberg, Reforming the Welfare State, 35 SOC'" 44, 44 (1998)
(reporting that "the welfare state is under broad attack" for failing in its goals and for possibly
even "worsen [ing] the conditions it was designed to alleviate"); Free to Grow, WALL ST.J., Sept. 3,
1996, at A16 (quoting World Economic Forum report: "We know that the era of big
government is over.... The current social welfare system is proving to be too heavy a
burden-even for rich European countries such as France, Germany, and Sweden."); Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Republican Reforms Fail Market Tes J. OF COM., Apr. 18, 1996, at A5 (stating that
"[t]he welfare state has become an unworkable and crushing burden"); Joseph Kahn, China
Quietly Shrinks Classic Welfare State, Leaving People to Pay for Pensions, Healthcare, WALL ST. J., Jan.
30, 1998, at A10 (quoting a Chinese government official's report declaring that "the state
doesn't take care of people anymore. You take care of yourself."); James S. Smith, Latin
Countries RediscoverJoys of Capitalism, LA- TIMES, Oct. 9, 1989, at 1 (noting that "[a]cross Latin
America, governments are throwing out their welfare-state economic recipes"). Welfare state
programs have fallen far short of feminist ideals: they generally incorporate race, class and
gender bias and have offered inadequate, stigmatized support for many caretakers-but recent
attacks on the welfare state aim to exacerbate, not alleviate these problems.
10. Duesterberg, supra note 9, at 44.
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For example, recent welfare "reforms" require parents in poverty to
substitute market labor or unpaid "workfare" for government support
for child care.' Increased pressure for labor market "flexibility" in a
competitive global market often requires working class and middle
class parents to bend their family lives to accommodate lower pay,
longer hours, fewer benefits and protections, and less stable
employment.12 Reduced government spending on social services and
public infrastructure means families-caretakers-put more time and
money into procuring or providing transportation, education, health
care, recreation, and dependent care.' Around the world, this
movement away from social support for human needs appears to
many to be the inevitable result of a newly integrated global
14
economy.
11. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 3, at 110-14 (discussing wage work
requirements in the federal Family Support Act of 1988 and in subsequent state legislation); see
generallyJOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND
WELFARE (1997) (criticizing the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 and recent state "welfare reform" policies for inadequate attention
to the problems of low-wage labor).
12. See Guy Standing, Labor Insecurity through Market Regulation: Legacy of the 1980s, Challenge
for the 1990s, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY: WESTERN STATES IN
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 153-79 (Katherine McFate, Roger Lawson, & William Julius Wilson
eds., 1995) (discussing the growth of worker insecurity and inequality from "flexible labor
markets"). Whether flexibility is good for women with caretaking obligations depends on who
has to be flexible, the employer or worker; much of the new labor market "flexibility" involves a
female-dominated "secondary" job market with less control and more risk for workers. See
generally CHRIS TILLY, HALF A JOB: BAD AND GOOD PART-TIME JOBS IN A CHANGING LABOR
MARKET (1996). For example, some employers explain the advantages of part-time
employment as the ability to cover shifts at odd and unpredictable hours. Id. at 72. See also
PIERRE BOURDiEu, ACmS OF RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 34 (Richard Nice
trans., 1998) (criticizing "flexible working" as "another magic word of neoliberlsm...
meaning night work, weekend work, irregular working hours, things which have always been
part of the employers' dreams").
13. See Isabella Bakker, Engendering Macro-economic Policy Reform in the Era of Global
Restructuring and Adjustment, in STRATEGIC SILENCE: GENDER AND ECONOMIC POLICY 10-13
(Isabella Bakker ed., 1994) (discussing the effect on women in many nations, both North and
South, of reduced government capital expenditures, service delivery, and public employment);
Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Introduction, in PAYING THE PRICE: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STRATEGY 1-12 (Mariarosa Della Costa & Giovanna F. Dalla Costa
eds., 1993) (arguing that economic adjustment policies imposed by international institutions on
some African and Latin American countries have systematically intensified women's family and
community labor and worsened conditions for women and children). In the United States,
federal domestic discretionary (non-entitlement) spending fell from nearly five percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the late 1970s to a littie more than three percent of GDP in
the late 1980s and early 1990s; this spending includes many resources which support caretakers
and dependents, such as education, Head Start, and housing assistance. See Doug Henwood, 88
LEFT BUS. OBSERVER, Feb. 25, 1999, at 1, 7.
14. SeeTHOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE xviii (1999) (introducing his
book on the triumph of global free-market policies by explaining that he views "globalization"
like the sunrise: there's not much he can do to stop it, and he's not going to waste time trying).
See BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 34 (criticizing the "myth" of "globalization" as "the main
weapon in the batties against the gains of the welfare state"); GARY TEEPLE, GLOBALIZATION AND
THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM 104-07 (1995) (describing and criticizing the neoliberal
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What accounts for the widening chasm between Fineman's vision
and the current political reality? How can we begin to establish
collective responsibility for caretaking as the reasonable, reachable
policy goal Fineman elegantly shows it to be?
Fineman's visionary proposal is blocked from mainstream view by
two strands of right-wing ideology. First, and most obviously,
neoconservative ideology defends a hierarchical and patriarchal
vision of caretaking at the margins of state and market, relegated to
unpaid or underpaid women in families headed by men. For
example, George Gilder argues that the "most fundamental" problem
with welfare is that it tends to "destroy the key role and authority of
the father."15 Second, neolibera16 ideology, which defends the "free
market" and "economic efficiency" as pillars of state and society, may
present a more subtle but even stronger barrier to Fineman's vision.
Like neoconservativism's overtly gendered vision, neoliberalism's
superficially gender-neutral doctrine keeps caretakers and their
dependents-most women-from securing their fair share of support
from the state and market.
Fineman explains that "we all live subsidized lives." 7 At one level,
this statement recognizes the importance and universality of
rationales for dismantling the welfare state in industrial countries); JULIA S. O'CONNOR, ANN
SHOLA ORLOFF & SHEILA SHAVER, STATES, MARKETS, FAMILIES: GENDER, LIBERALISM & SOCIAL
POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT BRITAIN & THE UNITED STATES 219-22 (1999) (describing
how globalization has formed a "policy logic" in those four countries that hasjustified economic
changes harmful to women, including restricted social programs and restructured labor
markets); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NoT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL
CAPIrrALISM 360-87 (1997) (giving examples of global market pressures constraining the welfare
state in Germany, Japan, and the United States, and arguing that these pressures are not
inevitable but dependent on political choices).
15. George Gilder, The Coming Welfare Crisis, 11 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV. 25, 26
(1980). Gilder goes on to complain that the father "can no longer feel manly in his own
home.... In the welfare culture, money becomes not something earned by men through hard
work, but a right conferred on women by the state." Id. at 26-27.
16. Neoliberalism revives the nineteenth century laissez-faire ideals of markets unfettered
by government regulation. See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEIPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS 14-16 (1998) (discussing the "return toward traditional liberalism around the world"
and distinguishing this "liberalism" from the common American usage of the term as the
opposite of "conservativism"). The term "neoliberal" gained prominence in reference to
policies led by the United States in response to the 1980s Latin American debt crisis. These
policies typically include cutting federal spending (particularly funds for social welfare
programs), raising consumption taxes, tightening credit, maintaining high interest rates, and
promoting increased foreign trade and investment. See Enrique Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and
Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World,
30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221 n.117 (1994). For a discussion of the historical development of
neoliberal economic theory, see TEEPLE, supra note 14, at 2-3. Though the term "neoliberal" is
more often used outside of the United States, I use it in part in an effort to join a global
conversation not cabined by the limited spectrum of American "liberal" and "conservative"
politics-neither of which challenge fundamental assumptions of "free market" ideology.
17. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 22.
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caretaking. None of us are self-made; all have depended on others-
especially mothers-to give us birth, to nurture and teach us in the
myriad ways required to become functional human beingP. All will
need to depend on others at some point in our lives to perform the
mundane tasks of daily living, as well as to reach larger goals. At
another level, we all live subsidized-and subsidizing-lives because
we all receive benefits-and costs-from a wide range of resources we
did not directly produce or purchase: whether in the form of
government aid, inheritance, tax breaks, private charity,
infrastructure, the natural environment, or the generations of labor
and wisdom that went into shaping the political, social and economic
institutions that frame our lives. Fineman's dystopian vision shows
how far from the mainstream we would have to go to try to construct
a world of "un-subsidized" lives.19
From this foundation of subsidized lives, Fineman questions why
some subsidies are "stigmatized while others are hidden" or
rewarded. In this Article, I aim to follow up on her question by
exploring how neoliberal ideology, which pervades contemporary
policy, scholarship, and culture,2 makes ubiquitous subsidies take on
drastically different meanings.
Neoliberalism incorporates and promotes the neoclassical version
of economics as a matter of scientific fact divorced from politics or
ideology.2 Neoclassical economics teaches that scarce resources
mean we cannot have it all, but that impartial cost-benefit
18. See Fineman, Crackingthe Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that infants will
perish if not nurtured).
19. SeeFineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 19, 27-28.
20. SeeFineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 23.
21. "Everywhere we hear it said, all day long-and this is what gives the dominant discourse
its strength-that there is nothing to put forward in opposition to the neo-liberal view, that it
has succeeded in presenting itself as self-evident, that there is no alternative." BOURDIEU, supra
note 12, at 29 (criticizing the dominance of free-market ideology). See also YERGIN &
STANIsLAiw, supra note 16, at 14-15 (favorably describing a fundamental shift in ideas, with the
result that "it is the University of Chicago's free-market school that is globally influential in the
1990s").
22. See, e.g., Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Three Marketeers, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 39
(reporting that leading U.S. policymakers Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin, and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers insist on focusing
on free-market economic facts beyond ideology or partisan considerations). Legal scholars
analyzing feminist issues frequently treat neoclassical economics as an objective, descriptive tool
separable from political ends. See, e.g., EDWARDJ. McCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 168-69 (1997)
(expressing some skepticism about the neutrality of neoclassical economic theory in tax law, but
concluding that it "does provide an external grounding... outside the subjective preferences
of any one author, or of any liberal, culturally elite vanguard"). For a critical analysis of how
neoclassical economic analysis in law incorporates value judgments in the guise of value-free
science, see Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism 60 VA. L. REV.
451,478-81 (1974).
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calculations tell us how to make the most of what we have.25 The
question of which subsidies are public rights and which subsidies are
public wrongs thereby appears to become a question of economics,
not politics-of principle or fact, not power.24  Neoliberal ideology
transforms the privatization of caretaking from a moral, divine, or
biological imperative (in the view of neoconservatives and the
religious right) to an economic imperative.2 5
Feminists-including Fineman-have gone far to expose the biases
underlying seemingly neutral liberal principles in the context of
equality theory.26 But as "efficiency" goals eclipse "equality" goals,"
feminists' critical scrutiny needs to turn toward "economic efficiency"
principles. By re-envisioning subsidies for dependency,8 Fineman
leads us in this crucial direction.
23. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998) (declaring
that "[e]conomics is the science of rational choice in a world-our world-in which resources
are limited in relation to human wants").
24. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAiN, REGULATORY LAW & POLICY 55 (1993)
(economic analysis deflects normative criticisms by disclaiming any normative judgments
implicit in economic theory); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 118-21
(1987) (explaining that Law and Economics claims to base its policy prescriptions not on moral
or political goals but on a technical and empirical determination of people's freely chosen self-
interest).
25. See, e-g., YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 16, at 323-24 (asserting that Europeans will
reduce their welfare state programs because "the overextended welfare system undermines the
ability to create the wealth required to pay for it" and because of "competitive pressures" from a
newly integrated global economy). Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers explained
U.S. economic policymakers' approach to global economic problems by saying, "we start with
the idea that you can't repeal the laws of economics," quoted in Ramo, supra note 22, at 36
(interviewing Summers during his former job as Deputy Treasury Secretary). For an insightful
analysis of how neoliberal ideology conjoins with conservative authoritarianism, despite
neoliberalism's apparent emphasis on individual freedom, see EVAN WATKINS, EVERYDAY
EXCHANGES: MARKmVORKAND CAPITAUST COMMON SENSE 49-54 (1998).
26. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 52 (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY]
(explaining how equal division of property at divorce ignores most women's unequal
contribution to caretaking); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 111 (1990)
(presenting an equality approach that recognizes difference not as located in particular
persons, but as produced socially from the perspective of those with the power to label others);
CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-35 (1987) (analyzing attributions of gender
"difference" as a problem of gender "dominance").
27. See Gerald F. Seib & Alan Murrey, Changed Party: Democrats'Platform Shows How Dfferent
They Are From 1972, WALL ST.J.,July 15, 1992, atAl (quoting 1992 Democratic Party platform's
statement that "[a]n expanding, entrepreneurial economy ... is the most important family
policy, urban policy, labor policy, minority policy, and foreign policy America can have"); see
also Irving Kristol, Board of Contributors: Hoover, Nixon, Carter... Bush?, WALL ST.J., Oct. 8, 1990,
atA12 (stating that "[t]he American people are much more interested in economic growth and
in the individual economic opportunity it creates, than in coercive redistribution of income or a
legislated equality of condition.").
28. See Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 19, 22-23 (explaining
collective support for caretaking as payment on a social debt, in contrast to the dominant view
of caretaker subsidies as charity).
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I. FROM "SPECIAL" TREATMENT TO "REDISTRIBUTIVE" TREATMENT
In an earlier book, Fineman broke new ground by explaining how
the illusion of equality serves to shift family resources away from
caretaking women in divorce.2 ' The neoliberal illusion of efficiency
similarly serves to shift state and market resources away from
caretaking women in work and citizenship. The opposition between
"efficiency" and "redistribution"-or between economic "growth" and
social "equity"-is a central strategy through which public subsidies to
support caretaking needs are constructed as antithetical to state,
market, and family, while public subsidies to support (non-human)
capital and corporate needs are constructed as essential to state,
market, and family.
In neoclassical economic theory, "efficient" policies are those that
increase the overall size of the economic "pie,"" while "redistributive"
policies are those that change the size of different slices within the
"pie."31 This opposition between wealth creation and wealth division
forms the dominant framework for analysis of law and policy today.
Liberals and conservatives disagree on the relative weight that should
be given to each side of this opposition, but scholars and
policymakers typically assume that these two choices frame the
debate.
29. See generally FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQuALHiY, supra note 26, at 52 (arguing that the
principle of equality in divorce law reform has harmed many women by treating them the same
as men even though they tend to be unequal in terms of unpaid family labor).
30. See A. MICHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed. 1989).
This definition of "efficiency" reflects how the term is commonly used in law and policy, id., and
is a rough statement of what is more technically called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Neoclassical
economics defines Kador-Hicks efficiency as resource allocations that produce aggregate gains
outweighing aggregate costs (even though some individuals may be worse off). See POSNER,
supra note 23, at 14. In contrast, Pareto optimality, a "purer" version of efficiency, occurs when
resource allocations make the pie bigger (increasing aggregate gains) without making any slice
smaller (no one is worse off, in their own subjective view). Id. But true Pareto efficiency is at
best impractical when applied to real-life policy questions, at worst a tautology; because by
definition it only happens when no one would object to it happening. See KELMAN, supra note
24, at 120 (describing Pareto efficiency as a banal concept).
31. See POLiNSK , supra note 30, at7.
32. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1823 (1995) (noting that "the tradeoff
between maxdmizing and equalizing (whether utility, wealth, or resources) ... is a familiar
one"); ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975) (discussing the
question of the proper balance between equality and efficiency as the central challenge for
American society); MARTIN NEIL BAILY, GARY BURTLESS & ROBERT E. LITAN, GRoWTH WITH
EQUITY: ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3 (1993) (evaluating a range of
policies according to two contrasting goals of "growth" and "equity").
33. See, e.g., NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 189 (1997) (describing a continuing debate about whether
economic efficiency or fair distribution should be law's primary concern, and supporting a
search for a balance between the two goals); KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK,
INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 18 (1986) (presenting insurance law issues as a
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Just as contemporary public policy analysis presents two competing
choices, efficiency versus redistribution, traditional equality analysis
similarly presents two competing choices, equal treatment versus
special (or different) treatment.34 Within both of these analytical
frames, one choice tends to appear objective, the other subjective;
one choice tends to appear neutral, the other preferential."5 This
article argues that for both frameworks, that appearance is false. By
framing the choices this way, both dichotomies mask inherent biases
and baseline moral judgments that devalue caretaking labor.
To bring caretaking from the margins to the center, feminists have
challenged the supposedly neutral framework of equality law where
support for women's particular needs-such as the demands of
caretaking-is constructed as a "special" accommodation outside the
scope of "normal" equal treatment. 6  Similarly, to bring caretaking
from the margins to the center in the neoliberal age, feminists must
challenge the supposedly neutral "free market" framework within
which women's particular needs-especially those of caretaking-are
choice between the contrasting goals of efficiency and redistribution); CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE
MARKETS AND SocIAL JuSTIcE 350 (1997) (rejecting economic efficiency as an absolute
requirement for regulatory statutes, and instead favoring a balance between economic
efficiency and other goals, such as redistribution); Anne L. AIstott, Tax Policy and Feminism:
Competing Goals and Institutional Choices 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2013-16 (1996) (analyzing
feminist tax policy in terms of choices between competing goals of efficiency and equity);John
J. Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1337, 1366 (1989) (concluding that judgments about how to value and interpret
employment discrimination laws depend on choices between equity and efficiency goals, but
arguing that efficiency as well as equity can support strong sex discrimination laws); Michael I.
Swygert & Katherine Earle Yaines, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into
Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1998) (proposing a model for reconciling these goals).
34. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity in the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142-44 (1986) (summarizing the feminist debate
over equal versus special treatment, and noting that this binary is also described as the choice
between formal and substantive equality, or between equality of opportunity and equality of
outcomes); see also PeterJ. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination
Law, 97 MicH. L. REv. 564,567 (1998) (explaining that the equal versus special rights debate in
the context of sexual orientation shows the limits of the equal/special binary); Martha Minow,
The Supreme Cou, 1986 Term: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 31 (1987) (drawing a
parallel between the feminist equal treatment/special treatment debate and the debate
between color-blindness and affirmative action in the racial equality context).
35. See Finley, supra note 34, at 1146 (explaining that the equal treatment/special
treatment binary makes "equal treatment" appear to be the more objective and value-neutral
choice); see infra text accompanying notes 65-73 (explaining and criticizing the parallel claims
to neutrality of "equal treatment" and "efficiency" approaches).
36. See, eg., Finley, supra note 34, at 1146 (arguing that equality analysis fails to challenge
male-biased workplace norms that make maternity and parenting a private matter special to
women); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL L. REV. 1279 (1987)
(arguing for a new "equality as acceptance" principle that would challenge social institutions
that devalue women's "differences," such as childrearing responsibility); Mary Becker, Prince
Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 201, 247 (1987) (analyzing how formal equality
has only limited potential for social change, noting that it fails to challenge job structures that
interfere with many women's parenting responsibilities).
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constructed as "redistributive" subsidies outside the scope of a
normally efficient market.
The efficiency/redistribution framework has become a primary
means of differentiating among programs of public support. Public
support for caretaking falls squarely on the "redistributive" side of the
line, in the conventional wisdom. For example, many characterize
the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDG),S7 the
target of recent federal welfare "reform," as redistributing money
from taxpayers to single parents (or unemployed couples) in
poverty.33 Similarly, many describe the Family and Medical Leave
Ace9 as redistributing resources from employers to workers by giving
some employees a right to twelve weeks unpaid leave from their jobs
for dependent care or serious illness.40
But, by framing collective responsibility for caretaking as a policy
choice in favor of redistribution over efficiency-fairness over
growth-neoclassical economic theory implicitly devalues this
choice.4' By definition, efficiency is about promoting overall gain
(maximizing aggregate resources);' redistribution is about benefiting
some at the expense of others (moving resources around).
Efficiency, in other words, is defined as furthering the public interest;
redistribution as furthering particular interests. 4' Even if these
redistributive goals deserve public support, compared to efficiency
goals, they will always seem parochial and problematic.
Since an efficient distribution of resources, by definition, maximizes
overall gain, a "re-distribution" of resources that deviates from this
efficient division will risk reducing overall gain.? According to the
37. 42 U.S.CA. § 601 (repealed 1996).
38. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 33, at 2077 (describing AFDC as an income transfer
program that redistributed federal revenues to the poor).
39. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. § 7 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
40. See, eg., Thomas F. Cotter, LegalPragmatism and the Law &Economics Movement, 84 GEO.
LJ. 2071, 2112 (1996) (giving example of the Family and Medical Leave Act as redistributive,
rather than efficiency-oriented).
41. See Martha T. McCluskey, Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 716-22 (1998) (using example of workers' compensation "reforms" to
show how, within the dominant economic fiamework, so-called efficiency goals wrongly appear
to produce the most equitable results); Cotter, supra note 40, at 2102-07 (summarizing and
questioning the mainstream law and economics argument that equity can be more effectively
achieved through efficiency-oriented laws).
42. See POLINSY, supra note 30, at7.
43. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 721 (criticizing the use of "efficiency" in workers'
compensation policy to construct certain interests-particularly those of employers and
insurers-as "public" and workers' interests as "special").
44. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 717, 717 n.245.
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neoclassical framework, then, redistribution poses tough tradeoffs.
Scarce resources limit the benefits that can be achieved by re-dividing
the pie in pursuit of fairness.
Following this reasoning, the dominant economic theory teaches
that redistributive policies driven by good intentions (such as
subsidizing caretakers) will have unintended consequences that hurt
both their beneficiaries and others. For example, the smaller pie
resulting from a choice of redistribution over efficiency may negate
the gains resulting from the redistribution.5 A redistributive subsidy
may provide a temporarily bigger "slice" of the pie, but at the risk of
shrinking the overall pie-thereby diminishing that slice over the
long run and hurting the beneficiaries of the redistribution, as well as
others."
Many feminists have criticized the equal treatment/special
treatment framework for presenting a bad choice for women with
caretaking responsibilities, arguing that either way women lose.47
Under this framework, women can either be "equal," at the cost of
ignoring gender differences (social or biological) such as the
particular demands of pregnancy or caretaking.8 Or, women can be
"different," at the cost of perpetuating pregnancy or caretaking needs
as inherently deviant and dependent on "special" protection. 49  For
45. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Reality of Redistribution, in POVERTY & INEQUALITY:
ECONOMICS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 127-30 (Jon Neill ed., 1997) (using mainstream
economic theory to assert a tradeoff between redistributive income transfers and aggregate
growth).
46. See id. at 130-31 (questioning the ethics of providing a gain to the current poor at the
expense of the future poor, based on the assumption that redistribution reduces growth that
would benefit the future poor).
47. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 221
(1989) (explaining that approaching equality as a matter of sameness or difference "merely
provides two ways for the law to hold women to a male standard"); Finley, supra note 34, at 1158
(explaining how the "focus of equality analysis on comparisons with the male norm makes it
well-suited for perpetuating existing distributions of power").
48. See FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQuALITY, supra note 26, at 21-30 (discussing problems
of the equal treatment standard, particularly in family law); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1003 (1984) (criticizing Constitutional doctrine for failing
to reconcile the "ideal of sex-based equalitywith the reality of categorical biological difference"
and developing an approach to equality doctrine that would subject laws governing
reproductive differences to heightened scrutiny); Linda J. Kreiger & Patricia N. Cooney, The
Miller Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983) (arguing against an "equal treatment" approach that
prohibits sex-based protection for pregnant women in the workplace).
49. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 26, at 35 (rejecting a "difference"
approach); Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279 (1998) (suggesting a redefinition of equality rather than a
rejection of equality in favor of "difference"); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985)
(arguing for the treatment of pregnancy as similar to disability rather than as a "difference" in
need of "special treatment").
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example, the "normal career track" assumes freedom from caretaking
demands; but the "mommy track" channels workers with caretaking
responsibilities into a separate and subordinate path which is likely to
lead to lower pay and greater job insecurityss Anti-feminists (and
some liberal feminists) insist that we cannot have it both ways: women
must either demonstrate equality and independence by forsaking
"special" protections, or else accept (or even celebrate)
subordination and insecurity as the price of difference.5'
Though superficially neutral, the efficiency/redistribution
dichotomy presents a similarly skewed choice for feminism in general
and caretaking responsibilities in particular. Either way, most
caretakers (and most women) lose. Feminists can choose
"efficiency," which involves directing public assistance away from
caretaking in order to support economic growth. Or, feminists can
choose "redistribution," which involves taking public assistance away
from economic growth in order to support caretaking-with the
predicted result that many caretakers (and society as a whole) will
face greater economic insecurity in the long run. According to "free
market" theory, the economic reality of scarce resources dictates that
we cannot have it both ways. If feminists insist on rights to
redistributive subsidies, they must accept the hidden costs of these
subsidies.
Examples of the purported costs of "redistributive" policies are
legion. In the prevailing story told by welfare "reform" advocates, the
former federal AFDC program ended up hurting the families it
aimed to subsidize.52 This view asserts that AFDC created a "cycle of
dependency" by providing an alternative to wage work (or wage-
working husbands) for single mothers, thereby encouraging women
and families in poverty to forgo productive labor market (or
marriage) opportunities that supposedly would have improved their
50. See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 870 (1997) (using
the "mommy track" as an example of the problems with a "difference" approach to equality);
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1183, 1237 n.197 (1989) (discussing how alternative models for combining work and
family may become de-valued as "mommy tracks").
51. See Interview ly Mary Tillotson with Suzanne Fields, CNN & COMPANY, Cable News Network
(Transcript #479) (Dec. 1, 1994) (giving the antifeminist argument against protections from
sexual harassment and date rape on the ground that women cannot assert equality and
victimization at the same time); Williams, supra note 49, at 367 (giving feminist arguments
about the costs to women of treating pregnancy as a "difference" rather than as a condition
similar to physical conditions affecting men). Criticizing such reasoning, Catharine MacKinnon
explains that as long as equality is framed as an issue of women's sameness or difference
compared to men, "women's demands for sex equality will appear to be demands to have it
both ways." See MACKINNON, supra note 47, at 233.
52. See Duesterberg, supra note 9, at 44 (stating that critics believe the welfare system may
worsen the problems it alms to solve).
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lives in the long run. In addition, many condemned AFDC for
shrinking the "economic pie," arguing that this "redistributive"
program diverted society's resources from "productive" economic
activity that would have improved job opportunities for welfare
recipients (and others).-4
Similarly, according to predominant wisdom, redistributive
subsidies aimed at helping working or middle class caretakers also
end up hurting their intended beneficiaries. For example, many
argue that the employer-based subsidy for family care (unpaid work
leave) mandated by the Family and Medical Leave Act induces
employers to limitjobs and wages for workers with caretaking needs.'5
And once again, the neoclassical framework predicts that by diverting
employers' resources from "production" to "redistribution," we will
sacrifice economic growth and competitiveness-thus leading to
fewer jobs and higher consumer prices in the long run.8 Western
European countries are often cited as a warning of these tradeoffs:
more generous protections for workers and families bring high
unemployment and slow economies, so the conventional story goes, 7
although the evidence of this link is tenuous.'
53. See Pete Wilson & Chuck Poochigan, Cafornia's Gains in Welfare Reform are Merely a Start,
FRESNO BEE, July 1, 1997, at B5 (discussing what they describe as the "inescapable conclusion
that while the welfare system was begun with the best of intentions, it has begun a downward
spiral of permanent dependency and suffocating hopelessness... it is stifling and degrading to
the very people it claims to help").
54. See David Charney, The Emplyee Wefare State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1601, 1602
(1996) (stating the conventional economic argument that welfare programs have hurt
economic growth).
55. See Maria O'Brien Hylton, Parental Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price for Time Off,
52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 475, 493 (1991) (finding that parental leave policies create incentives for
lower pay and fewerjobs).
56. For example, Massachusetts' business lobbyists warned that proposals for paid family
leave would put state businesses at a competitive disadvantage. Diane E. Lewis, Mass Advocates
Hail Clinton Family-Leave Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 1999, at D2.
57. See Sylvia Nasar, WhereJoblesness is a Way ofMaking a Living N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, § 4
(The Week in Review), at 5 (attributing high European unemployment rates to generous safety-
net programs); see also James H. Weaver, What Is Structural Adjustment in STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT, RETROSPECT AN PROSPECT 10 (Daniel M. Schydlowsky ed., 1995) (explaining
that, for less developed countries, wages are often "kept higher than market wages" by social
insurance schemes, and that International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies
designed to reduce labor protections and wages are a means of bringing about a "great increase
in the use of labor" that will foster economic development). This reasoning rests on the
problematic assumption that a shift in labor from unpaid domestic labor to wage labor (often
combined with unpaid labor) is necessarily good and "productive." See infra notes 109-13 and
accompanying text (questioning the biased norms incorporated in dominant standards of
"growth" and "productivity").
58. See; e.g., Rebecca Blank, Does a Larger Social Safety Net Mean Less Economic Flexibility?, in
WORKING UNDER DNIFERENT Ru.ES 157, 178 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994) (finding that
differences among nations in family leave and day care policies affected family behavior, but
that other factors caused higher European unemployment rates in the 1980s and 1990s).
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The primacy of efficiency over redistribution is the core principle
of the neoliberal "consensus" that drives contemporary policymaking
in the U.S. and much of the world.' 9 As a Wall Street Journal article
approvingly noted, the choice of efficiency over redistribution now
has bipartisan support.60 The article quotes the 1992 Democratic
party platform to show how far that party has turned away from the
redistributive goals of its past "above all, instead of dividing the
economic pie, [the "new" Democratic party] focuses on making the
pie grow."61 Similarly, the 1996 national Democratic party platform
singled out welfare as an example of the failures of redistribution,
and highlighted "reforms" replacing welfare with wage work as an
example of the party's embrace of the opposite course of wealth-
production.2 After President Clinton's 1996 reelection, the head of
the Democratic Leadership Council attributed Clinton's continued
success to his ability to "reconnect the Democratic Party with its real
tradition... of economic growth and opportunity, not
redistribution." 3
To defend public support for caretaking, feminists must challenge
not simply this prevailing choice of efficiency over redistribution, but
also the framework that makes redistribution seem so costly. That is,
we must show that efficiency is not only the wrong goal, but an illusory
goal-just as Fineman showed that a neutral concept of equality is
illusory and should be abandoned.H As with the equal
treatment/special treatment dilemma, feminists can escape the bad
59. See GERALD EPSTEIN, JULIE GRAHAM & JESSICA NEMBHARD, Introduction, in CREATING A
NEW WORLD EcoNOMY: FORCES OF CHANGE AND PLANS FOR ACTION 3-4 (1993) (explaining and
criticizing the new "conservative consensus" embracing free market ideology for domestic and
international policy); GREIDER, supra note 14, at 264, 270-71 (describing the development of the
neoliberal "Washington Consensus," embracing privatization and financial deregulation);
Weaver, supra note 57, at 5 (describing a "remarkable convergence" among theoreticians and
policymakers in favor of "laissez-faire, free trade" strategies for economic development);
MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POvERTY 17 (1997) (concluding that "[a]
'political consensus' on macro-economic policy has developed, governments throughout the
world have unequivocally embraced the neoliberal policy agenda"). Some commentators see
this consensus as beginning to unravel at the end of the 1990s, particularly after recent global
economic crises. See, e.g., Robert L. Borosage, The Global Turning THE NATION, July 19, 1999, at
19.
60. Seib & Murrey, supra note 27, at Al (reporting that the Democratic Party's 1992
platform reveals a fundamental change in policy, possibly because of increased fund-raising
demands).
61. Seib & Murrey, supra note 27, atAl.
62. See Platform Committee to the 1996 Democratic National Convention, available in Westlaw,
1996 WL 490886, at *41.
63. Joel Bleifuss, WhoseParty Is It?, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at 12 (quoting Al From, in
a speech for the Democratic Leadership Council's annual policy forum).
64. See FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALIrY, supra note 26, at 189-90 (summarizing the
failures of equality principles in the context of divorce law).
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choices of the efficiency/redistribution dilemma by showing that this
framework rests on biased norms and double standards.
II. WHOSE EFFICIENCY?
Fineman and other feminists have explained how seemingly
neutral ideas of "equality" in liberal theory in fact incorporate
gendered norms.6e Women's reproductive or caretaking needs are
"different" and in need of "special" treatment only if one assumes as
the norm a person without these needs-such as a stereotypical
man.'e Any analysis of "sameness" or "difference" necessarily requires
a standard of comparison. 7 It is the implicit standard of a traditional
man that makes the choice of equal or different treatment so costly
for women-and so beneficial for men.ss Traditional men can be
both equal and different-having it both ways-because "equal"
treatment is defined to privilege their specific needs not as
"differences" but as unstated norms. 9 For example, the recent
constitutional challenge to the male-only admittance policy of the
Virginia Military Institute raised the question of whether women
should have "equal" treatment, by being given the opportunity to join
a public military-style school featuring a stereotypically masculine
"adversarial" model of education-or whether women would be best
65. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing how purportedly
gender-neutral approaches to equality have historically failed to remedy women's exclusion and
subordination); MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 26, at 34 (explaining that the
choice of the framework of sameness versus difference for equality law itself forms a political
strategy that conceals a male-biased standard); Finley, supra note 34, at 1152-59 (analyzing how
the assumption of a male norm in traditional equality analysis creates problems for women).
66. See Finley, supra note 34, at 1156 (explaining how maternity leave becomes "special" in
a pejorative sense "only because it is not something men need"); Ann C. Scales, Towards a
FeministJurisprudence, 56 IND. LJ. 375, 435-36 (1981) (arguing that legal recognition of women's
specific needs relating to pregnancy and breastfeeding should be a matter of equality not
"special" rights); Williams, supra note 49, at 318 (arguing that "allowing women to perform as
ideal workers along with the men but without the flow of family work that supports male ideal
workers is not equality, it is discrimination").
67. MINOW, supra note 26, at 3-4 (discussing how the traditional legal analysis of
"difference" incorporates unstated points of comparison that have social and moral
consequences).
68. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 26, at 34 (explaining that, "[u~nder
the sameness standard, women are measured according to our correspondence with man...
[u~nder the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence
with [man]").
69. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 26, at 39 ("this is the way men have
it: equal and different too ... the same as women when they are the same and want it, and
different from women when they are different and want to be, which usually they do");
Williams, supra note 49, at 318 (arguing that the central focus of equality should be
deconstructing masculine norms, rather than deciding between sameness and difference); see
also Martha T. McCluskey, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in Public
Transportation, 97 YALE LJ. 863, 870-73 (1988) (arguing similarly that biased able-bodied norms,
not "difference," should be the focus of disability discrimination law).
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served through "different" treatment, by being offered a separate, less
well-endowed, and less well-connected school featuring a more
nurturing approach Men who conformed to the dominant
stereotype, however, had no such dilemma: they had a prestigious
and prosperous publicly-supported school geared to their particular
"differences." This contrasting set of choices, one tough and one
easy, is neither neutral nor natural. It is the result of gendered
power: the political decision to devote public resources to promote a
specific ideal of masculinity.
7
'
In short, ostensibly neutral ideals of "equality" necessarily
incorporate assumptions about whose particular "differences" are
taken as the standard for comparison. Feminists accordingly ask the
questions: equal to whom, according to what standard?. Similarly, the
ostensibly neutral ideal of "efficiency" always incorporates
assumptions about whose particular interests are taken as the standard
for determining society's well-being. Feminists should ask the
questions: efficient for whom, according to what standard?. Distributive
ideals are integral to-not opposed to-efficiency ideals,72 just as
value judgments about "difference" are inherent in ideals of
"equality."
The current neoliberal view of "efficiency" rests on the biased
assumption that certain capital and corporate interests are necessarily in
the public interest-because these interests are the standard by which
economic growth is measured. In contrast, this view of "efficiency"
generally assumes caretakers' interests are private or special interests-
because these interests are defined as a deviation from that standard
of economic growth. Because the needs of elite capital and corporate
interests are presumed to stand for the needs of society as a whole,
these interests can have it both ways.73 They can be both subsidized
and efficient at the same time.
The current economic orthodoxy embraces this double standard as
an economic fact. "What's good for General Motors is good for
70. SeeUnited States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 526-27 (1996) (holding that Virginia's policy
of excluding women from admission to the Virginia Military Institute was unconstitutional sex
discrimination, even though the state established a new women-only institute).
71. For an analysis of how the school was shaped and re-shaped as Virginia's dominant
ideals, power relations, and morality changed, see Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical
Narratives and Social Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the VMS Case, 1996 S. GAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 189 (1996).
72. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 722-50 (showing how "efficiency" ideals incorporate
distributive values in the debate over workers' compensation "reforms").
73. Similarly, under traditional equality principles that make men the standard for
sameness and women the deviation, men have it both ways. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 26, at 39.
130 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 8:115
America" is a joke with a serious message. By presuming that our
existing economic structure generally reflects an efficient "free
market" that maximizes overall growth, this orthodoxy reaches the
circular conclusion that those whom the existing market benefits
most are those who benefit society the most-and therefore those
who should get the most social support.74 This rationale continues to
support the trickle-down policies which gained prominence in the
Reagan years.7s
For example, former President Bush explained that his capital
gains tax cut, directly benefiting the richest Americans, 7H would also
be best for the majority because it would "make us more successful in
the increasingly competitive international marketplace, creating
more jobs and better living standards for Americans."7  Support for
wealthy investors is therefore about "creating wealth" not
"redistributing wealth," according to Republican leaders.78 Similarly,
fiscal austerity policies, which are a centerpiece of neoliberal foreign
and domestic policy "reforms,"79 feature deficit-cutting provisions that
74. For example, Judge Richard Posner explains that "in general, the wealthier people will
be those who have the higher marginal products, whether because they work harder, or are
smarter, or for whatever reason." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 81 (1981). See also
Tullock, supra note 45, at 129-30 (declaring that "most economists would agree that taking
funds from the poor and giving them to the well-off would accelerate growth" and concurring
that such a policywould, in theory, make the poor better off).
75. See generally Golam Azam & Alonzo Redmom, Revisiting the Relationship Between Growth
and Poverty, 22 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 5 (1993) (explaining and criticizing the theory that
overall economic growth will provide benefits that trickle-down to all income and racial groups,
thereby making specific anti-poverty programs unnecessary); DAVID A. STOCIMAN, THE
TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: How THE REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED 8-9 (1986) (explaining the
"central idea of the Reagan Revolution" was that the good society rested on a "minimalist
government," strong free market, and "unfettered production of capitalist wealth... the
opposite of the coast-to-coast patchwork of dependencies, shelters, protections, and
redistributions that the nation's politicians had brokered over the decades"). For an analysis of
how President Clinton's economic policies have continued or even amplified the Reagan
administration's approach, see MICHAEL MEEROPOL, SURRENDER: HOW THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION COMPLETED THE REAGAN REVOLUTION (1998).
76. Eighty percent of the cut's benefit would go to individuals who earn more than
$100,000 a year. Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, Vote, Key Vitoyfor Bush, Increases the Likelihood of Tax-Cut
Law in 1989, WALL ST.J., Sept. 29, 1989, available at Westlaw, 1989 W_-WSJ 467839. Similarly, a
Treasury Department analysis of the 1999 House Republican tax cut proposal showed that
78.1% of the benefits would go to families with incomes exceeding $100,767 a year. Gregg Hitt,
House Clears $792 Billion Tax-Cut Plan, WALL ST.J.,July 23, 1999, atA3.
77. SeeBirnbaum, supra note 76.
78. See Birnbaum, supra note 76 (quoting House Republican leader and Illinois
Congressperson Robert Michel). Similarly, Republicans defended their 1999 tax cut proposals
against criticism that these would primarily benefit the very rich by suggesting the proposals
"would help ensure continued growth." Hitt, supra note 76, atA3.
79. See Stanley Fischer, Structural Adjustment Lessons from the 1980s, in STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, supra note 57, at 23 (arguing that "fiscal tightening is
almost always the key to stabilization" necessary to attract foreign investment for economic
growth, although it entails hardships for people in developing countries); Paul A. Gigot,
Clintonomics, Tastes Great, Less Filling WALL ST.J.,June 7, 1996, at A12 (explaining that Treasury
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shift government spending from social welfare programs and public
infrastructure to private investors (by making debt servicing or debt
reduction the fiscal priority). s° Neoliberal ideology explains that
favoring these capital interests will encourage more investment, and
therefore, more growth and jobs over the long run-thereby
benefiting the rest of society.8 '
But a standard of justice that measures public policy according to
the specific interests of the wealthiest capital holders is no more likely
to benefit the average caretaker and her family than is a standard of
equality that measures women according to the specific needs of the
stereotypical non-caretaking man. The double standard which holds
that public support for capital, not caretaking, will promote the
overall public good rests on ideological faith-and political power-
more than on economic evidence.
First, evidence of supposed "aggregate growth" resulting from such
policies is weak.82  More importantly, the "aggregate growth"
Secretary Robert Rubin prevailed over other Presidential advisors so that, in the Clinton
administration, "[d]eficit cutting became the White House priority, and the bond market its
official measure of success," adopting the ideal of "slow growth" so that "Wall Street won't get
scared by too much prosperity").
80. SeeDoug Henwood, Sloth and Discipline, 88 LEFt Bus. OBSERVER 1, 7 (1999) (explaining
that money for debt paydown comes disproportionately from low- and middle-income taxpayers
and is paid to mainly upper-income bondholders). The prominent "public choice" theory of
law and politics, based on neoclassical economic principles, typically presents deficit spending
as a problem of "special" interests, while assuming that the fiscal restraint of balanced budget
policies represent the "public" interest. See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced
Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1105, 1110, 1113-16, 1173-74 (1999) (presenting the neoclassical
reasoning underlying a purported scholarly consensus in support of deficit reduction, and
arguing that recent balanced budget policies demonstrate Congress' ability to act in the public
interest). Progressive critics explain that, depending on economic conditions, both deficit
spending and deficit reduction can be a means of redistributing resources from the majority to
elite capital interests. See TEEPLE, supra note 14, at 98-99; Robert Pollin, Can Domestic
Expansionary Policy Succeed, in GLOBALIZATION & PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY 433, 449-51
(Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein & Robert Pollin eds., 1998).
81. A "very important element" in neoliberal reforms for developing countries is the effort
to "change the relative prices of capital and labor" so that international capital gets higher
returns and freedom, and labor gets lower wages and fewer rights-on the theory that this will
benefit society through "a great increase in the use of labor." SeeWeaver, supra note 57, at 1, 10.
Similarly, Clinton administration policy assumes that shifting resources from social spending to
private capital interests will enhance the economy. See Economy: The Clinton Budget: President's
Budget Offers Broad Package of Tax Incentives and Spending Increases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1999, at A2
(quoting President Clinton's statement that "[t]he less money we tie up in publicly held debt,
the more money we free up for private-sector investment"); see also Amity Shlaes, Why Tax Cuts
Make Sense in Good Times, WALL ST.J.,July 1,1999, atA22 (stating that "there are plenty of good
reasons to cut top rates in a time of prosperity... the private sector is good at creating wealth
and jobs-today's unemployment is lower than it was in the heyday of the weightiest welfare
program").
82. Although the purported primary goal of neoliberal policies is to promote aggregate
"growth," neoliberal policies appear more effective at increasing redistribution (upward). One
analysis of the annual average rate of growth of GDP per capita for 56 countries shows that
growth declined in the period of liberalization (1973-1992) compared to the prior period of
currency and trade controls (1950-1973) in all regions of the world except for Asia. Robin
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promoted by neoliberal policies fails to benefit most people.' In the
United States, the majority of society has gained little from the
supposed economic booms of the 1980s and 1990s: the top one
percent of wealth holders received sixty-two percent of the total gain
in marketable wealth between 1983 and 1989, while the "bottom"
eighty percent of Americans received only one percent of this
growth.
84
Furthermore, while "growth" may produce jobs, more jobs do not
necessarily translate into improved living standards for the majority,
especially for caretakers-because more jobs can simply mean more
work for less gain. Income inequality rose more in the Clinton
economic recovery years of 1993 and 1994 than during the entire
previous decade of Reaganomics. In the mid-1990s, median family
income was less than it was in 1986.86 After inflation, private sector
workers' compensation per hour was less in 1995 than in 1992. '
From 1967 to 1997, the annual income of the poorest 20% in the
United States declined 2.4% and that of the middle 20% declined
0.7%, while the income of the richest 5% gained 20.4%." Even
though, since 1996, average wages have increased compared to the
early 1990s, these gains from economic expansion have still left U.S.
workers with lower average earnings (adjusted for inflation) than in
1973."'
Hahnel, Capitalist Globalism in Crisis: Part IV What to Want and What to Fear from Globalization, 12
Z MAG. 52, 53 (Mar. 1999) (citing figures from ANGUS MADDISON, MONITORING THE WORLD
ECONOMY 1820-1992, Appendix D, 193-206 (1995)). International Monetary Fund (IMF)
researchers have admitted that the economic evidence of improved economic "growth" from its
policies is uncertain. See Mohsin S. Khan, The Macroeconomic Effects of Fund-Supported Adjustment
Programs, 37 IMF STAFF PAPERS 195, 222 (1990) (stating that "it is often found that [structural
adjustment] programs are associated with a rise in inflation and a fall in the growth rate"). A
1997 internal IMF review reported lower per capita GDP growth during the period of 1991-95
for countries participating in its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, designed to foster
"sustainable economic growth," than in non-participating developing countries. IMF, TheESAF
at Ten Years: Economic Adjustment and Reform in Low-Income Countries, Table 1, (IMF Occasional
Paper No. 156, Dec. 1997).
83. In fact, the defining feature of neoliberal economic "expansion" may be that it does
not lead to wage increases for most. See Mark Weisbrot, Globalization for Whom, 31 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 631, 637 (1999) (stating that, during the Bretton Woods era, "a rising tide lifts all
boats," but that this is no longer true today).
84. See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HFAvY, 12-13 (1995). If we look at financial wealth only
(rather than total net worth), the majority of society lost ground from 1983 to 1989: this period
of"trickle down" growth left the "bottom" 80 percent with 3 percent ess financial wealth. Id.
85. See Paul A. Gigot, Potomac Watch: Clintonomics: Tastes Great, Less Filling WALL ST. J.,June
7,1996, atA12 (quoting Larry Lindsey, Federal Reserve Governor).
86. See id. (reporting data from White House statistics).
87. See id. (quoting Martin Felstein).
88. See Doug Henwood, Playing the Numbers: Proposal to Adjust Consumer Price Index, THE
NATION, Mar. 29, 1991, at4 (citing inflation adjusted figures).
89. In 1998, hourly wages for average workers were 6.2% below 1973 levels (adjusting for
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Moreover, many Americans have buttressed their stagnant or
declining income by working longer hours-a change that is
especially burdensome for caretakers. Americans worked for wages
138 hours a year more on average in 1987 than in 1969.90 This
growth in work hours has continued. In 1996, Americans' wage work
hours averaged forty-five hours a year more than in 1989;91 middle-
class married couples increased their annual hours of work outside
the home by more than three weeks a year during this same period.92
It took approximately 500 more hours of wage work to make the
average U.S. family income in 1997 than in 1977.93  Furthermore,
rising perceptions ofjob insecurity may make it harder for workers to
bargain for accommodations for family responsibilities.94
This trend toward lower wages, longer hours, and increased
income inequality extends worldwide. 5 The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has promoted neoliberal "structural adjustment"96
policies aimed at shifting developing nations' economic support from
social welfare to private capital, but these policies have produced
inflation); weekly wages were 12% below 1973 levels. CHUCK COLLINS, BETSYLEONDAR-WRIGHT,
& HOLLY SKLAR, SHIFTING FORTUNES 27 (1999). In contrast, non-farm business productivity
rose almost 33% from 1973 to the late 1990s. Id. See generally LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED
BERNSTEIN & JOHN ScHMrrr, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1998-99, 119-218 (1999)
(presenting data on changes in wage levels and structures over the last several decades).
90. Juliet Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157, 158 (1994).
91. MisHEL, BERNSTEIN & SCHMITT, supra note 89, at 122.
92. MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SCHMrT, supra note 89, at 17-18.
93. Doug Henwood, WorkDetail 86 LEFT BUS. OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 1998, at 1.
94. See Paul Loop, Champion of Working Moms: Pediatrician T. Berry Brazelton Sees a Hardening
of Attitudes Against the Needs of Parents, L.. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at D2 (interviewing child
development expert who explained that recent trends of downsizing and layoffs make it harder
for parents, especially women, to get employers to accommodate family needs); Phineas
Baxandall & Marc Breslow, Does Inequality Cause Ovework, in REALWORLD MACRO 25 (16th ed.,
Marc Breslow, Ellen FrankJohn Miller, Abby Scher & the Dollars & Sense Collective eds., 1999)
(reporting economists' analysis that American workers' insecurity, due to high inequality and a
precarious middle class, has caused them to increase work hours rather than leisure during
recent periods of economic growth). From 1979 to 1990, 24% of workers in large corporations
reported that they feared job layoffs; by 1995 and 1996, that percentage increased to 46%. See
Weisbrot, supra note 83, at 635-36 (quoting the Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking Housing and
Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 36 (1997) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System)).
95. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OPEN
M ARKETS MATTER: THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION 11 (1998)
(admitting increased inequality of wages and increased unemployment for some in OECD
countries, but arguing that neoliberal policies promoting international trade and investment
have contributed only modestly, at most, to this problem); see also CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note
59, at 38 (declaring that "[iun many indebted Third World countries, real salaried earnings in
the modern sector have declined by more than 60% since the beginning of the 1980s").
96. "The objective of structural adjustment programs is ... to establish a market-friendly
set of incentives that can encourage the accumulation of capital and more efficient allocation of
resources." WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA 2 (1994).
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little evidence of trickle-down benefits to the average caretaker and
her family. Indeed, much evidence suggests that most women and
their dependents have paid an enormous price. In most developing
nations, "structural adjustment" policies appear to have led to
increased prices for basic consumer goods97 and to dramatic declines
in public sanitation, public health, education, and infrastructure."5
For large portions of the world's population, these effects have
contributed to catastrophic increases in disease' and malnutrition, ' °°
97. Neoliberal policies purport to benefit consumers in the aggregate through reduced
prices from a more competitive marketplace and reduced inflation. In fact, however, neoliberal
policies often result in rising prices for non-luxury goods, such as food and water. Reduced
subsidies for domestic agriculture, reduced public infrastructure spending, increased
dependence on imported goods, and collapsed currency prices are some of the typical factors
contributing to these price increases. See Nicole Wendt, 50th Anniversary of the World Bank and
the IVMF Prompts Criticism, Part B(5) at 6, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT BOOK
(Enrique Carrasco, ed.) (visited July 2, 1999) <http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/Part-
Two/Two-II.shtmI>; see also CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 38-41 (stating that neoliberal
policies of global economic integration have caused "dollarisation" of prices of food staples and
other necessities, bringing commodity prices closer to U.S. levels, but without concurrent wage
and income increases). In 1992, it took the equivalent of nine months of an average worker's
pay to buy a winter coat in Russia. Id. at 227. After Peru imposed neoliberal austerity policies in
1990, consumer prices in Lima were higher than in New York, while average earnings
plummeted. Id. at 191. More recently, high prices of maize-meal sparked food riots in
Zimbabwe, but the IMF and World Bank threatened to withhold credit to frustrate government
price controls on grain and bread. Price Controls Threaten IMF US $200 Million Support, ZIMB.
INDEP.,June 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, African News.
98. See generally CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 101-258 (describing case studies of social
impact of neoliberal policy in Somalia, Rwanda, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Brazil, Peru,
Bolivia, Russia, and the former Yugoslavia). One researcher investigating African women's
health in 1989, following structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank,
found "drastic reductions in the budgets of hospitals funded by the African Governments and
in all health services" with particularly devastating effects on maternity wards. Andree Michel,
African Women, Development and the North-South Relationship, in PAYING TIE PRICE, supra note 13, at
58, 65-66 (reporting findings of Fran P. Hosken). For another example, the World Bank and
the IMF recently required Mozambique, as a condition of debt relief, to increase charges for
health services and to eliminate government spending on a planned system to provide clean
water and sanitation services to that country's rural poor (although, following political pressure,
these institutions permitted some increased social spending). Africa Policy Information Center,
Mozambique Gains an Extra $28 Mn in Debt Relief AFRICA NEWS, July 7, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library. Mozambique, a model of compliance with investor-friendiy neoliberal policies
promoted by the IMF, spends twice as much on interest payments to foreign creditors as it does
on health services. Michael Holman & Quentin Peel, Too Much to Bear, FINANcIAL TIMES
(London), June 12, 1999, at 12. In African countries participating in the JMF's Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility, which provides low-interest loans conditioned on compliance
with free-market structural adjustment policies, the average annual education spending
declined between 1986 and 1996. Robert Naiman & Neil Watlins, A Survey of the Impacts ofLMF
Structural Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social Spending & Debt Relief April 1999 (visited Jan. 18,
2000) <http://vrw.preamble.org/IMFinAfrica.htm> (citing data from the IMF and the Poor,
IF Pamphlet Series 52 (1998)).
99. See CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 72 (reporting a resurgence of formerly controlled
communicable diseases in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and India, arguably caused or
exacerbated by declines in urban sanitation and other forms of public health spending as a
result of structural adjustment programs). After neoliberal "shock treatment" in Peru,
government vaccination programs broke down and government hospitals were closed,
contributing to epidemics of tuberculosis, malaria, dengue, and leishmaniasis. CHOSSUDOVSKY,
supra note 59, at 201. In Zimbabwe, an external review of the IMF's policies reported that these
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resulting in depressed standards of living and life expectancies '
Women typically increase unpaid labor to compensate for the loss of
public services and increase in hardship.
102
Although neoliberals tend to argue that this disastrous global
economic situation would be even worse without the recent shift in
support from human needs to capital needs, 113 any truth to that
argument may be attributable to contingent-and gendered-
"reforms" reversed a previous trend of improving health outcomes; for example, tuberculosis
cases quadrupled after many years of decline. Naiman & Watkins, supra note 98 (citing KWEISI
BOTC-VEY, PAUL COLLiER, JAN WILLEM GUNNING & KOiCHi HAMADA, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF
INDEPENDENT PERSONS APPOINTED TO CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE
ENHANcED STRUCTURALADJUSTMENT FACILITY (1998)).
100. See CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 192, 203 Table 10.4 (describing a rise in
malnutrition following structural adjustment policies in Peru, where estimated food
consumption dropped 25% from 1975 to 1985, after that nation's first series of neoliberal
"reforms"; by 1991, more than 83% of the population had "deficient calorie intake"); id. at 129
(describing how neoliberal economic policies in India, adopted under an IMF program, led to
widespread famine and increased starvation deaths due to falling wages and rising food prices);
Marc Breslow, Freedom to Farm-And Starve-In Kenya, 223 DOLLARS & SENSE 14, 14 (1999)
(reporting that, in Kenya between 1970 and 1995, the daily supply of protein per person fell by
17%, and discussing how such problems are related to neoliberal policies).
101. For example, Russia's life expectancy for men declined from 65.6 to 57 in five years.
Robin Hahnel, Capitalist Globalism in Crisis: Boom and Bus 11 Z MAG. 46, 48 (Dec. 1998).
Economist Michel Chossudovsky concludes that "[i]n both the South and the East, the
compression of living standards since the early 1980s has been considerably greater than that
experienced by the rich countries during the 1930s." CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 26. He
describes the effects of structural adjustment policies as "economic genocide." See id. at 37. In
sub-Saharan African countries participating in the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF), real per capita incomes declined an average of .3% a year during the period of
IMF adjustment between 1991 and 1995. Naiman & Watkins, supra note 98, at Section One (1)
(citing a personal communication with Hugh Bredenkamp, principal author of an internal IMF
review of the ESAF).
102. SeeJanine Brodie, Shifting the Boundaries: Gender and the Politics of Restructuring, in THE
STRATEGIC SILENCE: GENDER AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 50 (noting that "women
have acted as 'shock-absorbers' during adjustment by curtailing their own consumption and
increasing their workoad... [so that] social services are shifted from the paid to unpaid labour
of women."); Michel, supra note 98, at 65 (stating that African structural adjustment policies
"reassign" services from the public budget to women); Elmira Nazombe, Women's Labor. A Key
Factor in Globalization (visited Aug. 25, 1999) <http://www.50years.org/ejn/v2nl/women.html>
(published by 50 Years is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice, a coalition of
organizations "dedicated to the profound transformation of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund") (explaining how women's unpaid labor makes up for cuts in
social services resulting from neoliberal "globalization" policies). For example, IMF and World
Bank policies aimed at promoting export crops in African nations have caused many male
farmers to emigrate to cities in search of wage work, leaving their wives to assume full
responsibility for family labor, including agricultural production. Michel, supra note 98, at 60.
See also Lisa A. McGowan, Bailouts for Bankers, Burdens for Women (visited Aug. 25, 1999)
<http://www.50years.org/factsheets/balouts.hml> (published by 50 Years Is Enough: U.S.
Network For Global Economic Justice) (stating that IMF-driven agricultural policies in Africa
have decreased women's farm income and increased their time as unpaid laborers).
103. SeeWeaver, supra note 57, at 13 (acknowledging evidence of negative effects correlated
with structural adjustment policies in some countries, but saying that "even the 'losers' may be
better off with reforms than without"); see also CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 69-70
(criticizing this kind of "counterfactual argument" and arguing that it reveals a contradictory
reasoning that austerity-depressed growth-is the best route to increased growth).
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political power, not to inviolable economic principles. President
Clinton, for example, backed away from spending on social programs
when Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan threatened to raise
interest rates.TM  Similarly, threats of capital withdrawal have
prevented many developing nations from sticking to their goals of
maintaining social services. 105
But if countries restructured political and legal institutions to give
more control to the average caretaker and less to elite capital
interests, governments might have more bargaining power with which
to make social spending less costly. Imagine, for example, the
different economic choices that might be available if the law required
the Federal Reserve's committee for setting monetary policy to meet
openly and to include the same number of child care workers and
welfare recipients as bankers, 06 or if the International Monetary
Fund's governance structure gave a significant voice to women and
their dependents in developing countries.' 7 Or, imagine the
104. SeeJacob Schlesinger, Vie Clinton Budget: Keynes Mutiny: Why Is the Economist Passe, With
So Much of the World in Recession?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1999, at 1 (explaining that Greenspan
makes it dear that he would "punish higher deficits with higher rates-a major factor in
keeping the Clinton administration's spending desires in check"); see also ROBERT REICH,
LOCKED IN THE CABINET 60-64 (1998) (describing his experience with the Clinton
administration budget process through an imaginary drama in which Greenspan appears as an
evil magician threatening to "wreck the economy" if the President fails to cut government social
spending). Clinton also shelved his plans to support social program spending in response to
campaign finance demands. Rick Wartzman & Dana Milbank, Crossing Over Clinton's Strength
with Business Leaders is Rare for a Democrat, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at 1. Without major
campaign finance reform, most politicians are unlikely to shift public support from capital
interests to most caretakers' interests.
105. "Every fewweeks a team of economists from the International Monetary Fund shows up
in Moscow to determine if [Russian Prime Minister Primakov] has put together what they
politely term a realistic budget." David E. Sanger, Markets Are Freer than Politicians, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1999, at 5 (describing how the "struggle between what investors demand and what
politicians think they need to do to satisfy their constituencies is visible every day"). See
CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at 18 (reporting how Moody's Investor Services downgraded
Sweden's debt rating in 1995, pressuring the government to cut child allowances and
unemployment benefits). The IMF has substantial power to shape local policy because
countries facing balance of payment problems usually must get IMF approval before other
financial institutions, public or private, will provide credit. Weisbrot, supra note 83, at 651.
106. Currently, monetary policy is set by the Federal Open Market Committee in secret
meetings by twelve voting members; five of these membership slots are, in effect, reserved for
representatives of commercial banking interests who own and control district Federal Reserve
banks. DouG HENWOOD, WALL STREET 96-97 (1997). For a proposal to increase public control
over the Federal Reserve, see Robert Pollin, Transforming the Fed: A Path to Financial Stability and
Democratic Socialism, in REAL WORLD MACRO, supra note 94, at 91-94.
107. Current law does not give developing countries (much less women in those countries)
a democratic voice in IMF policy, and efforts to adopt a one-nation one-vote rule have been
unsuccessful. Sandra Blanco, The 1960s and 1970s: The World Bank Attacks Poverty; Developing
Countries Attack the IMF, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT BOOK Part One, IV.
(B) (1) (Enrique Carrasco, ed.) (visited Aug. 3, 1999) <http://w.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/Part-
One/One-V.shtml>. U.S. Representative Bernie Sanders has drafted a Congressional
Resolution that proposes increasing transparency and democracy in the IMF and other
international policymaking bodies. See Global Sustainable Development Resolution (visited
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different political choices that might be possible if major campaign
finance reforms allowed Presidents and Congressional members to
seek election without catering primarily to corporate and capital
interests.10s
Even if we accept the neoliberal credo that "aggregate growth"-
efficiency-is good for its own sake (regardless of whether the
majority shares in that gain), 1°9 we are still left with the question of
whose growth should count in measuring that aggregate gain.
Conventional measurements of economic growth, such as Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), are biased against caretaking. For
example, GDP counts as growth an increase in health care expenses
due to a rise in cancer cases from corporate pollution.' In contrast,
GDP does not count as growth an improvement in a family's health,
leisure and happiness when a mother has more time free from wage
work to take her child to the park after school, instead of leaving the
child alone in front of the television."' Nor would GDP include as
"growth" the family's gain from visiting a free public park instead of
paying for a private recreational facility."2  If the conventional
Aug. 25, 1999) <http://wv.house.gov/bernie/legislation/global/resolution.html>. This
proposed Resolution states that voting in international financial institutions such as the IMF
and World Bank "must move toward the standard of equal representation for all the world's
people" rather than giving dominant voting privileges to the rich countries. Id. at Section
4(5) (B). It also declares that "procedures, decisions and programs of organizations including
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization need to be
open to public scrutiny." Id. at Section 4(5) (C). Furthermore, it states that "decisions about
international economic agreements and loans should require participation by labor unions,
environmental groups, women's organizations, development organizations, and other major
sectors of civil society in each affected country." Id. at Section 4(5) (D). For other efforts to
restructure international financial organizations to increase women's representation, see
Women's Environmental and Development Organization, Women's Eyes on the Bank Sept. 1997
(visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.wedo.org/global/bank.htm> (describing an international
campaign to increase participation of grassroots women in the World Bank's economic
policymaking); Women's Environmental and Development Organization, Women Take on the
World Trade Organization (WF02) (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://"vw.wedo.org/global/
wto.htn> (reporting on an international campaign to increase transparency in WTO meetings
and to advocate for participation of women's NGOs).
108. See generally DAN CLAWSON, ALAN NEUSTADTL & MARK WELLER, DOLLARS AND VOTES:
How BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS SUBVERT DEMOCRACY 19-21 (1998) (explaining the
powerful influence of campaign contributions in skewing public policy toward business
interests, and proposing systematic reform).
109. Although efficiency is the stated goal of neoliberal policies, this should not be taken at
face value; evidence of redistribution from these policies appears stronger than evidence of
improved "aggregate growth" as defined by conventional economics. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
110. See Marc Breslow, Is the U.S. Making Progress?, in REAL WORLD MACRO, supra note 94, at
6 (criticizing current standards for calculating GDP).
111. See Breslow, supra note 110, at 6 (explaining how GDP counts as negative the economic
change resulting when a couple reduces their wage work hours, thereby decreasing their child
care expenses and increasing family well-being).
112. That gain would count indirectly in GDP if the family spent the money saved from the
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standards for measuring economic "growth" included unpaid
household labor and caretaking, it could suddenly transform
subsidies for a range of caretaking activities disproportionately
performed by women from costly "redistribution" into productive
"growth.""5
III. WHOSE MORAL HAZARD?
In sum, the dominant efficiency/redistribution framework
incorporates a double standard that exaggerates the public benefits of
corporate and capital subsidies compared to caretaker subsidies. In
addition, this framework perpetuates a double standard that
exaggerates the public costs of caretaking subsidies compared to
corporate and capital subsidies. In particular, the prevailing ideology
of efficiency provides a purportedly value-neutral economic
justification for complaints about "welfare dependency." 4
According to neoclassical economics, to fully account for the costs
and benefits of any given subsidy, we need to consider the inevitable
incentive effects." 5 That is, subsidies may change as well as support
behavior." 6 That incentive effect underlies the problem economists
term "moral hazard"-the tendency of those who receive protection
against a certain cost to take less care to avoid that cost than they
free park on more consumption or increased savings. No gain in GDP would occur if the
reduced expense allowed the family to reduce wage work hours or if the free park allowed the
family to engage in more desirable activities (for example, if it allowed family members to
improve their health by substituting walking for TV watching). This is an example of how
biased assumptions of what counts as an economic "gain" make "privatization" appear more
advantageous than it really is. Neoliberal policies often encourage substitutions of formerly free
public services with private facilities charging user fees, resulting in reduced access to those
facilities and increased need for disposable income from wage work-thereby increasing the
burden on caretakers. See Dalla Costa, supra note 13, at 7-8 (explaining and criticizing how the
structural adjustment p6licies of the IMF and World Bank purposely rely on the "creative
response" of women's "domestic management" and increased wage labor to make up for cuts in
public services).
113. See Marjorie W. Williams, Gender, Productivity and Macro-economic Policies in the Context of
Structural Adjustment and Change, in THE STRATEGIC SILENCE: GENDER AND ECONOMIC POLICY,
supra note 13, at 81-82 (discussing how gender-biased measurements of macroeconomic growth
give misleading support for diverting government subsidies from social spending that benefits
women to subsidies for corporations); Kathleen Cloud & Nancy Garrett, Counting Womens Work,
in REAL WORLD MACRO, supra note 94, at 12-13 (discussing alternative calculations of economic
growth that recognize women's unpaid household labor).
114. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 240 (1996)
(explaining and criticizing how the economic concept of moral hazard gives the appearance of
a "scientific" basis for abandoning anti-poverty policies).
115. See, e.g., DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER: THE ECONOMICS OF EVERYDAYLIFE 36 (1996)
(explaining the neoclassical theory of the incentive effects of subsidies, using an example of
potato price subsidies).
116. For example, subsidizing the price of potatoes, other things being equal, would
encourage people to buy more potatoes than they would otherwise. Id at 38-39 (explaining the
conventional economic theory that subsidies make everyone worse off).
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would otherwise.1"7 Neoclassical economic theory explains that moral
hazard is inefficient: it hurts society in the long run by driving up
overall costs."8
In the recent debate over federal welfare "reform," the pervasive
demands for "personal responsibility" have focused both explicitly
and implicitly on moral hazard. For example, Heritage Foundation
commentators explained that "[tlhe key problem is that welfare
programs present a 'moral hazard' ... when welfare benefits are tied,
directly or indirectly, to such behaviors as low work effort, divorce,
and illegitimacy, welfare strongly promotes an increase in those
behaviors." 9
This Heritage Foundation report emphasizes the public harm
resulting from welfare's moral hazard: "[T]he more that is spent, the
more people in apparent need of aid who appear. The taxpayer is
trapped in a cycle in which spending generates illegitimacy and
dependency, which in turn generate demands for even greater
spending."2 ' Critics of other subsidies for caretakers have also
stressed moral hazard problems. For example, conservatives have
warned that federal subsidies for day care expenses will create
financial incentives to remove children from unpaid family home
care into "institutional" settings.'
But the supposed harms of moral hazard are social constructions,
based on gendered values, not economic truths. The idea behind the
"moral hazard" concept is simply that we tend to get more of
something when it is subsidized. Whether or not that increase is
117. The term "moral hazard" comes from the insurance industry. In the eighteenth
century, fire insurers categorized underwiting risk by distinguishing "physical hazards"-such
as buildings made from wood instead of brick-from "moral hazards"--such as character flaws
that might make an insured person prone to arson or carelessness. See CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE
RISK AND RATIONALAcTON (1985) (discussing the history of moral hazard and explaining how
moral hazard problems shaped insurance contracts and institutions).
118. See, e.g., Ir DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 291 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed.
1995) (defining moral hazard as resulting in "an allocation of resources that is not optimal");
FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 277 (noting that moral hazard is a type of externality).
119. See ROBERT RECTOR & WILLIAM LAUBER, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, AMEIcA's FAILED
$5.4 TRILLIoN WAR ON POVERTY 3 (1995). This report by two Heritage Foundation staffers, one
of whom left to work [on welfare reform] for a Republican congressman, indudes the caveat
that it is not to be taken as an indication of the Heritage Foundation's views or as an attempt to
influence public policy. Id. at inside front cover. This caveat is probably evidence less of the
real intent of the report than of moral hazard: a change in behavior (or at least in appearances)
to get the subsidy (tax break) afforded to nonprofits not engaged in lobbying.
120. 1& at 3.
121. Specifically noting that federal subsidies for child care expenses create moral hazard
problems, one business publication warns, "It would be nice, first, if politicians took their minds
off the big giveaway and thought a little about where all these proposals are taking us ....
Toward a bigger, richer child-care industry that will pull more parents out of their homes and
into the paid work force." Day Care Crazy, INvESTORS' Bus. DAILY, Dec. 19,1997, at A26.
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good or bad depends on a baseline norm: a value judgment about
the appropriateness of having more of whatever is subsidized.
Consider the boom in corporate subsidies that has accompanied
the recent decline in government social spending and welfare
support. To encourage businesses to relocate or remain in their area,
state and local governments have shelled out a conservatively
estimated $50 billion a year in the 1990s for business tax breaks,
grants, loans, and services, along with plentiful protection from
regulation.SH In a similar global trend, many nations offer generous
subsidy packages to cultivate business development that otherwise
might not be feasible.SH
Subsidies to attract business present a classic example of moral
hazard. To maintain or attract local jobs, governments protect
businesses from some of the risks of providing those localjobs. 14 But
the more governments "insure" businesses against the costs of job
creation, the more costly-and uncertain-job creation becomes for
governments. 1H These subsidies encourage businesses to seek greater
profit not through improved productivity or innovation, but by
moving (or threatening to move) to jurisdictions that offer better
protections, generating a cycle of escalating demands for ever-greater
government handouts.2
This moral hazard from corporate welfare is rarely labeled or
condemned as such. Although criticism of government "bidding
wars" is beginning to get more attention in the mainstream media,"7
the dominant political position appears to accept these bad
incentives as a price worth paying.2 8 The public costs of collective
122. See Neil DeMause, Corporations Jump from Town to Town in Search of the Best Public Subsidy,
IN THESE TIMES, May 31, 1998, at 11-12. This is more than annual expenditures for welfare and
food stamps-and does not include even greater federal spending on corporate subsidies. Id.
123. See GREIDER, supra note 14, at 82 (describing the "globaIjobs auction" whereby rich and
poor nations compete to make the greatest concessions from the public domain to attract
multinational corporations).
124. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, States at War, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998, at 44
(reporting that Pennsylvania subsidized a European shipbuilding corporation in hopes of
keeping alive an otherwise dying industry that provides high-paying local jobs).
125. For example, as a condition of receiving government subsidies for a Rochester, N.Y.,
facility, the multinational corporation Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (ABB) promised to increase jobs
but instead eliminated them. Id. at 46.
126. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377, 388-89 (1996) (describing escalating
subsidies offered to attract automobile manufacturers). "[A]s the interstate competition
intensifies, businesses are seeking incentives not only for the siting of new facilities, but also for
simply keeping facilities in their present locations." Id. at 389.
127. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett &James B. Steele, SpecialReport: Corporate Welfare, TIME, Nov.
9-30, 1998 (writing a series of articles on local and state subsidies aimed at attracting business).
128. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Five Ways Out, TIME, Nov. 30, 1998, at 66
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support for corporate relocation are widely discounted-in contrast
to the presumed public costs of collective support for caretaking.
This double standard for moral hazard rests on several problematic
normative assumptions that should be examined and challenged
more openly. First, the incentive effects of corporate subsidies are
often constructed as inherently desirable, ignoring any harmful
effects. In the dominant rush to improve the "business climate," the
general assumption tends to be that it is good if business subsidies
produce more business than otherwise would be possible under
existing economic and legal conditions. In contrast, dominant
politics often assumes it is bad that welfare or child care subsidies
produce more child care-or children-in families that are not self-
sustaining under existing legal and market arrangements. This logic
values profits and jobs over children and caretaking.
But of course, the effects of more business or even more jobs are
not necessarily beneficial to society. Corporate subsidies that succeed
in attracting business may increase costs through lost funding for
investments in public infrastructure and social services,
I2
environmental damage,3° higher taxes,13' higher government debt
costs, 2 2 decreased productivity,3 3 or a decline in political legitimacy.us
(reporting that "it's not much of a debate; the mayors cave" when faced with never-ending
demands for corporate subsidies as the price of local jobs); see also infra text accompanying
notes 151-55 (describing the perception that corporate subsidies are now a normal part of
doing business).
129. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 124, at 40-42, 50-52 (giving the example of a town in
Arkansas unable to obtain funds for a safe water supply, while the state subsidized an expensive
water treatment facility for a Frito-Lay plant; and giving another example of an overcrowded
Alabama elementary school with inadequate dassrooms and failing sewer system in a town with
a new Mercedes-Benz plant, attracted by $253 million in incentives). A Minnesota study
reported that corporate subsidies diverted $100 million a year from education funds. See
DeMause, supra note 122, at 12.
130. See Donald L. Barlett &James B. Steele, Paying a Price forPolluters, TIME, Nov. 23, 1998,
at 72 (giving examples of serious environmental and health hazards resulting from companies
that receive corporate tax breaks in the name ofjob protection).
131. The rise in using corporate tax breaks as "incentives" for business development has
placed an increasing share of tax burden on others. SeeEnrich, supra note 126, at 382.
132. Connecticut's subsidy for the (failed) relocation of the New England Patriots football
team would have added $350 million in general obligation bonds to a debt level already ranked
by Standard & Poors as one of the highest in the nation. William C. Symonds, Hartford's Hail
Mary Pass, BUS. WK, Dec. 7, 1998, at 38.
133. "Selective subsidies for mobile capital are likely to shift resources into footloose
businesses, even though those resources could have been deployed more productively
elsewhere." Enrich, supra note 126, at 405.
134. Political leaders often feel pressured to bypass open democratic processes to compete
in bidding wars. For example, Connecticut lawmakers approved a football stadium subsidy
without advance notice of the details of the deal, and with public testimony limited to one
evening after TV news broadcasts. See Christopher Rowland, Providence to Play Host if All Goes
WeUforPats, PROVIDENCEJ. BULL,Jan. 2, 1998, atAl. The state rushed to complete the deal in
an (unsuccessful) attempt to prevent the team owner from pursuing negotiations with other
142 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY& THE LAW [Vol. 8:115
In addition, the supposed benefits from increased jobs may be
illusory: jobs may be transferred, ' or even eliminated, rather than
increased;... or anticipated jobs may be low-paying, unsafe, or
temporary. 7
Just as the supposed economic and social benefits of subsidies to
attract private business can be viewed as costly moral hazards, the
supposed moral hazards of caretaking subsidies can be constructed as
social and economic benefits-depending in part on one's values
about gender, race, class and sexuality. Martha Fineman's work
powerfully advances the feminist view that making it easier for women
(or men) to care (and to better care) for children outside
patriarchal, economically privileged families is good for society.s For
example, the so-called moral hazard from caretaking subsidies means
more healthy, happy, and productive parents and children among
the large numbers of families that do not fit the traditional
stereotype. This supposed moral hazard also means less dependence
by caretakers and children on abusive or unloving breadwinners, and
less dependence of caretakers and children on unsafe, unhealthy, or
unsatisfying jobs. As Deborah Stone argues, some behavior changes
induced by protective subsidies should be viewed as positive "moral
opportunities" instead of negative "moral hazards.""9
A second way in which biased norms, not impartial science, creates
the double standard for moral hazard is through a selective rejection
of economic efficiency goals. When it comes to social spending or
labor regulation, advocates for an improved business climate typically
invoke neoclassical economics to stress the need to substitute tough-
minded cost-benefit calculations for soft-hearted sympathy for
dependents or their caretakers. 14' The predominant view purports to
cities. See id.
135. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 124, at 50 (giving an example of a Kansas town of 4,000
attracting a manufacturing plant with a $15.8 million subsidy that produced no net increase in
the company's payroll, but simply ajob transfer from other plants).
136. One critic quipped that the goal of corporate subsidies is not to create jobs, but simply
job announcements. See Bartlett & Steele, supra note 124, at 42 (quotingJohn Hood, president
of the John Locke Foundation). Time magazine's report concluded that "[a]lmost without
exception, local and state politicians have doled out tens of billions of taxpayer dollars to
businesses that are in fact eliminating rather than creatingjobs." Id.
137. See Bartlett & Steele, supra note 124, at 44 (giving an example of $24-31 million in
government aid awarded to a meat-packing company that provides high-turnover, lolk-paying
work and limits workers, mostly new immigrants, to one bathroom trip a day).
138. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 3, at 125 (criticizing society's failure
to affirm singie-mother households as a desirable family form).
139. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS.
LJ. 11 (2000).
140. See e.g., DANIEL J. MrrcHELL, WHY AMERiCA NEEDS A TAX CUT, THE HEmRAGE
FOUNDATION, Sept. 1996, at 1 (asserting that poicymakers need to subject more government
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make economic efficiency and individual responsibility the
overarching principles.' When it comes to fostering support for
corporate subsidies, however, pro-business advocates often argue for
the primacy of spiritual ideals and social connection over economic
calculations and individual autonomy.
For example, Connecticut legislators recently voted
overwhelmingly in favor of a record $374 million subsidy to
encourage relocation of the Patriots football team to Hartford.4
Supporters discounted evidence that the net economic benefits for
the state were meager at best.1'4 A consultant defended his favorable
report on the deal against criticisms of poor accounting by
emphasizing "that many of the benefits are intangible" and that "the
elected officials approved this project on more than just the
numbers .... It wasn't just a fiscal benefits driver."'" Political
leaders backing the deal stressed that it "galvanized everyone in the
community"' and could boost community "confidence,"46 "vibrancy"
and status, benefits that are "hard to measure in dollars." '47
Similarly, when business leaders lobbied county legislators for a $60
million subsidy for the Buffalo Bills football team, they sidestepped a
critic's efforts to investigate the costs and benefits of the deal like a
"smart business decision."'" Instead, advocates presented a report
spending programs, especially welfare, to cost-benefit analysis); Daniel Akst, Cold Facts About
Child Labor, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1999, § 3, at 4 (arguing that, although popular "sentiment"
opposes child labor, "cold facts" show that labor regulations protecting children impose more
costs than benefits).
141. See Duesterberg, supra note 9, at 1 (discussing how a focus on economic efficiency and
personal responsibility has become the dominant policy approach).
142. See Tom Puleo & Christopher Keating, State: We'll Take It by Overwhelming Margin,
Legislature Approves Patriots Package: Excitement of Deal Overtakes Doubters, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 16, 1998, at Al (reporting cost estimate from the legislature's Office of Fiscal Analysis).
For a discussion of the proliferation of government subsidies for sports stadiums, see generally
JOANNA CAGON & NEIL DEMAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS
PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT (1998) (criticizing the proliferation of government
subsidies for sports franchises).
143. While bipartisan staff analysts found that the state would lose money, a more optimistic
consulting firm reported that the impact would be revenue neutral. Puleo & Keating, supra
note 142, at Al.
144. See Glenn Cheney, KPMG Called Offsides on New England Patriots Study, AccT. TODAY, 5,
37, Feb. 22-Mar. 14, 1999 (quoting Ronald D. Burton, of consulting firm KPMG Peat Manvick).
145. See All Things Considered: Controversy Over the Deal the State of Connecticut Has Proposed to
Bring the New England Patriots to Hartford (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter
Controversy] (quoting Connecticut Speaker of the House Tom Ritter).
146. SeePaul Frisman, Patriot Games, CONN. L. Tam., Mar. 19,1999, at 11 (quoting supporter
and real estate attorney MichaelJ. Cacace).
147. See Controversy, supra note 145 (quoting Kevin Sullivan, Democratic President of the
State Senate, who promoted the benefits of "activity and vibrancy").
148. See Margaret Hammersley, Repot Calls Bills an Intrinsic Part of Life in WVNY, BUFF. NEWS,
June 6, 1997, at IC (reporting that Legislator Albert DeBenedetti, D-Buffalo, put himself at
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emphasizing that the benefits of the Bills are "not merely economic"
but of a "spiritual character," providing a "powerful unifying force" to
the community.49  A gendered double standard underlies the view
that state subsidies for football teams do not create a "cycle of
dependency" 5' in need of public restraint, but instead exemplify
beneficial community interdependence in need of public nurturing.
Third, the special treatment for moral hazards from corporate
subsidies is frequently justified on the ground that these costs are
inevitable."" As one news report concluded, "[u]nfortunately, the
subsidy game won't end anytime soon. That being the case, most
communities cannot afford to sit on the sidelines."" 2 In fact,
corporations tend to portray the competition for subsidies not as an
inefficient market disruption, but instead as the kind of rational self-
interest maximizing that grounds efficient markets. Defending Intel
Corporation's invitations to states to bid for subsidies for a new
computer-chip plant in 1993, an executive explained, "[w] e're going
to build where Intel gets the best deal."13 Similarly, after admitting
the intractability of moral hazard problems from IMF bailouts (which
subsidize international investors),' 5" IMF Deputy Director Stanley
Fischer advised that "we should remind ourselves that moral hazard is
something to be lived with and controlled rather than fully
eliminated" because there are no better alternatives for dealing with
international debt crises.155
That is, neoliberal ideology presents corporate moral hazard as a
necessary price of economic development in a competitive global
market, while the caretakers' moral hazard is an unnecessary subsidy
odds with Democratic leadership by emphasizing the need to consider possible costs of the
subsidy).
149. See id. (quoting the report of a business task force of the Greater Buffalo Partnership,
presented to the Erie County Legislature).
150. One sports team owner explained that proposed federal legislation aimed at limiting
such corporate subsidies would have "a very negative impact" on the survival of professional
sports franchises. DeMause, supra note 122, at 13 (quoting Dave St. Peter, spokesman for the
Minnesota Twins, in response to the proposed Distorting Subsidies Limitation Act).
151. See, eg., Karen Brune Mathis, Spate of Incentives Is Raising Eyebrows: Officials Are Looking
for Ways to Track Development Dollars, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Dec. 1, 1997, at 8 (reporting that the
debate "has moved beyond" the question of whether incentives should be encouraged or
banned because state governments do not see any possibility for stopping the competition).
152. Tony Cox, Only the Real Stars Should Get Business Subsidies, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE,
Aug. 23, 1998, at BM5 (NW edition).
153. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 124, at 48 (noting that the company received over a
third of a billion dollars in aid from the highest bidder, Sandoval County, New Mexico).
154. SeeRobin Hahnel, Capitalist Globalism in Crisis, Part III: Understanding the IM, 12 Z MAG.
47,50 (Feb. 1999) (discussing IMF bailouts as taxpayer subsidies for international investors).
155. Stanley Fischer, On the Needfor an International Lender of Last Resort (visitedJune 9, 1999)
<http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1999/010399.HTM>.
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hindering competitive global economic development. This
difference stems from power differences-shaped by legal and
political structures-rather than from natural or neutral market
forces. Because neoliberal policies tend to increase capital mobility,
restrict local power to regulate business, and reduce collective
sources of support for families, workers, and communities, these
policies tend to make states, workers, and families more dependent
on corporate and capital interests. Legal and political impediments
to alternative routes toward economic development (such as support
for local businesses, wage hikes, unionization, public jobs, public
support for caretakers, as well as stricter antitrust laws) protect
national and multinational corporate investors from seeking support
on terms more favorable to taxpayers, workers, or families.56
Finally, Fineman's analysis of the universality of subsidies reveals
another bias in evaluating supposedly harmful incentives from
caretaking subsidies: moral hazard runs both ways, because
caretaking subsidies run both ways. 57 That is, reducing collective
support for caretakers will increase moral hazard by increasing the
subsidies provided by caretakers to the rest of society. Fineman's
insightful and transforming move is to cast caretakers as subsidizers as
well as the subsidized: the market and the state depend on their
unpaid or underpaid labor.'5s "Welfare reform" policies that require
caretakers to assume increased "personal responsibility" will therefore
increase subsidies by caretakers to society in general. These policies
make caretakers shoulder more of the costs of the dependent care
156. For example, rules of professional sports leagues construct the monopoly power that
makes communities dependent on ever-greater giveaways to retain professional teams. Mark S.
Rosentraub, Joanna Cagon & Neil Demause, Why Baseball Needs New York to Just Say No, NATION,
Aug. 10, 1998, at 20. IMF-enforced policies of economic "liberalization" and integration are
essentially about increasing nations' dependence on foreign investors and foreign corporations,
making nations vulnerable to fluctuations in currency and financial markets. CHOSSUDOVSKY,
supra note 59, at 45-73. Federalist structures tend to make local governments shoulder the costs
of interstate competition-bidding for the highest subsidy and the least regulation-without
giving those governments the power to retain the benefits of competition through
protectionism or interstate trade barriers. See Enrich, supra note 126, at 379-80. If courts
extended commerce clause prohibitions against protectionism to bar relocation subsidies, then
interstate businesses might have less power to externalize costs onto taxpayers. Enrich, supra
note 126, at 469.
157. Tom Baker shows how morfal hazard is a multi-sided problem; that is, reducing one
moral hazard problem tends to increase moral hazard somewhere else. See Baker, supra note
114, at 272-75. Moral hazard is the product of a reciprocal relationship in which each party may
provide a protective "subsidy" or "insurance" to the other, depending on the baseline values or
perspective from which that relationship is analyzed. See id at 275 (describing the "relational
nature" of moral hazard); McCluskey, supra note 41, at 747-48 & 747 n.353 (explaining the
multi-sided nature of moral hazard in the context of workers' compensation as an example of
the economic indeterminacy of moral hazard).
158. See Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 17.
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from which society benefits.'
These subsidies by caretakers to others create incentives for costly
behavioral changes-a typical moral hazard scenario. For example,
replacing "welfare" with "workfare" for single parents in poverty
increases subsidies to employers. "Workfare" requirements (and
other welfare limits) increase the supply of low-cost workers, which in
turn depresses wages and job security for competing workers."s As
employers increase their dependence on workfare (and former
welfare recipients) to reduce their labor costs, more workers will
increasingly need to supplement their wages (and offset increased
costs and longer working hours) with unpaid and underpaid
caretaking labor,61 taxpayer assistance, 62 or charity.' In a "cycle of
dependency," employers and shareholders increasingly may seek
profit not through the "hard work" of innovation and improved
quality, but through wage reductions and increased labor "flexibility"
(along with taxpayer and charitable subsidies) that redistribute and
add to the costs of caretaking for workers (and communities)."
In another example, "welfare reform" policies aimed at
discouraging the supposed moral hazards of single motherhood and
159. See Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 17 (explaining that all
members of society owe a debt to caretakers).
160. SeeMickey Kaus, Welfare Reform & ItsEnemies, WALL ST.J., Nov. 2,1998, atA37 (arguing
for the need to defend welfare reform against political challenges from unions who correctly
perceive workfare as undermining workers' interests in higher wages).
161. Relatives and children in need of care themselves often perform these unpaid family
labor needs. SeeJason DeParle, As Welfare Rolls Shrink, Load on Relatives Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1999, at Al (giving examples of grandmothers struggling with their own illnesses and
disabilities who took on care of grandchildren after the children's mothers lost government
assistance).
162. For example, in 1997 more than twice as many Americans benefited from the Earned
Income Tax Credit, which subsidizes parents in low-wage jobs, than in 1993. Council of Economic
Advisers, Good News forLow Income Families-Expansions in Income Tax Credit & Minimum Wage, M2
PRESwVnRE, Dec. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library. Spending on the EITC increased
eleven-fold from 1986 to 1996, reaching $21 billion. Gary Burtless, GrowingAmerican Inequality,
17 BROOKINGs REv. 31, 34 (1999). School lunch subsidies increased six percent between 1994
to 1997, although anti-welfare policies have decreased recent use of food stamps by the eligible
working poor. Shailagh Murray Drop in Food-Stamp Rolls is Mysterious and Worrisome WALL ST.J.,
Aug. 2, 1999, atA20.
163. See, e.g., Heather Boushey, Life After Welfare, 90 L.FT BUS. OBSERVER 3 (June 28, 1999)
(discussing reports of surging demand at soup kitchens and food banks, particularly from low-
waged workers). Catholic Charities reported a 38% average increase in food assistance in 1998.
SeeMurray, supra note 162, at A20.
164. Similarly, in a decision upholding minimum wage legislation, the Supreme Court
reasoned that such laws do not necessarily force employers to subsidize workers, but instead
may relieve taxpayers from subsidizing unconscionable employers who fail to pay a living wage
and thereby force their workers to supplement their earnings with government relief. SeeVest
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397, 399 (1937) (overruling a previous Lochner era case); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochners Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 873, 876 (1987) (analyzing this case as an
example of how the idea of a "subsidy" requires baseline norms).
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"illegitimacy" could instead be viewed as increasing moral hazard
among heterosexual men seeking families. Conservative welfare
critics often worry that many men will have difficulty attracting or
retaining wives and children if they have to compete with other
sources of support available to mothers.'6' By adopting policies that
skew public support for caretaking to "traditional" families,'66 the
state subsidizes some heterosexual men, so that they do not have to
make as much effort as they otherwise would to satisfy their wives and
children (using conservative welfare critics' logic). These subsidies
lead to what could be construed as a "cycle of dependency" in which
men increasingly seek to retain marriageability or fatherhood
through state regulation and state subsidies rather than by taking
"personal responsibility" for their needs.67
Finally, on a global scale, neoliberal policies-enforced by the IMF,
World Bank, and international economic agreements-often increase
moral hazard by shifting the costs of social programs from the state
and the market to the family. Fineman notes that caretakers' unpaid
or underpaid labor is a societal debt used to support market and state
institutions.16e Collective support for caretakers is therefore an
obligation owed in payment for this debt.'69 In this view, neoliberal
fiscal austerity policies that reduce social support for caretakers result
in a default on debt payments.
This caretaking "debt default" in effect requires caretakers to
subsidize international investors. When the VIMF's "structural
adjustment" policies require nations to cut social spending to reduce
government deficits, an intended effect is to divert more government
165. See Gilder, supra note 15, at 26 (explaining that "nothing is so destructive" to men's
values, emotional well-being, productivity, and sexual potency than the knowledge that his wife
and children may not need him as a financial provider).
166. One example of such a policy is the income-splitting, joint filing system in federal
income tax lav that allows financially well-off (and heterosexual) married couples consisting of
one high-earning spouse and one homemaking or low-earning spouse to tax the high-earners'
income as if it were divided equally between the spouses-effectively allowing traditional middle
and upper class "breadwinners" to "purchase" caretaking services with pre-tax income. See
Martha T. McCluskey, A Critical Analysis of the Treatment of Dependent Care and Household
Expenses in Federal Income Tax Theory 55-56 (1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). In contrast, this tax system penalizes low-income families and married couples with
relatively equal incomes. See MCcAFFERY, supra note 22, at 137-38.
167. I am not necessarily endorsing extending such a "personal responsibility" approach to
men in traditional famiilies receiving state subsidies; instead, my aim is to reveal the double
standard which unfairly stigmatizes other subsidies. I concur with Fineman's goal of creating a
system of caretaking subsidies available to caretakers regardless of their family type, and which
would go to the family member who performs the caretaking labor rather than to a
"breadwinner" who receives support from a caretaker. See FRNEMAN, THE NEuTERED MOTHER,
supra note 3, at 232-33.
168. SeeFineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 21.
169. SeeFneman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 19.
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resources from social welfare programs to payments to international
creditors such as commercial banks.' 70 The caretaking "debt default"
that typically results from deficit-reduction policies provides
international investors with higher returns for less risk by decreasing
trade deficits, decreasing inflation, and supporting currency value.1
7 1
But these subsidies by caretakers to international financiers create
moral hazard problems. Policymakers often use neoliberal fiscal
austerity programs to bail out lenders whose original loans have failed
to achieve expected economic results.7 1 If governments alter their
fiscal policies to protect international creditors against economic
difficulties that threaten investment returns or debt repayment, then
international lenders may be less careful in making loans. As a result,
we now face the possibility of a "cycle of dependency" in which
international investors are becoming less self-sufficient, seeking
profits through increased cost-shifting to unpaid or underpaid
caretakers rather than through prudent investing-arguably
contributing to a global race to the bottom that increases overall
costs.
17 3
International institutions like the World Trade Organization
(WTO) were formed to prevent the destructive competition that can
170. See Wendt, supra note 97, at Part Two (explaining critics' concerns that IMF/World
Bank programs force many countries-like South Korea-to divert spending from social needs
to repayment of commercial bank loans that failed to improve the countries' economies); see
also Prabhat Patnaik & C.P. Chandrasekhar, India: Dirigisme, Structural Adjustment, and the
Radical Alternative. GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE ECON. POL'Y, supra note 80, at 83-84
(describing how India's structural adjustment program included a deficit-reduction policy that
"increased transfers from the state to rentiers in the form of interest payments, and has
concurrently enforced larger fiscal burdens on the people and cuts in public investment").
171. See Hahnel, supra note 154, at 47-48 (explaining that international creditors benefit
from a surplus of exports over imports that raises local currency values, making debt
repayments less risky); see also Fischer, supra note 79, at 24-31 (explaining that to attract the
investment necessary for renewed growth, "the importance of fiscal policy is hard to
overemphasize"); WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 96, at 182-83 ("Keeping
budget deficits small helps in controlling inflation and avoiding balance of payments
problems," which promotes "realistic" exchange rates beneficial to international investment).
Furthermore, spending cuts that eliminate alternative income sources may increase investors'
bargaining power relative to labor, thereby allowing investors to pocket a larger share of
productivity gains. See, e.g., Dorene Isenberg, The European Monetary Union: New Mandates for
Conservative Macro Policies, REAL WORLD INTERNATIONAL 46, 48 (Marc Breslow, Devid Levy, Abby
Scher & the Dollars & Sense Collective eds., 5th ed. 1999) (quoting Association of German
Employers president Dieter Hundt's approval of Maastricht treaty requirements for reduced
social spending on the ground that these would increase incentives to work).
172. Wendt, supra note 97, at Part Two, n (B) (5) (discussing critics' claims that, through
IMF and World Bank mandates for reduced social spending, the poor bear the burdens
resulting from failed commercial bank loans meant to improve the economy).
173. See HARRY SHUTT, THE TROUBLE WITH CAPITALISM: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF
GLOBAL ECONOMIC FAILURE 75 (1998) (noting a "fundamental fraud" at the heart of neoliberal
orthodoxy: the expanding welfare state is dismissed as unrealistic "self-indulgence," while "the
one central reality.., is the inescapable dependency of big business on the state").
2000] SUBSIDIZED LIVEs AND THE IDEOLOGY OF EFFICIENCY 149
result from protectionist national subsidies.14 In orthodox economic
trade theory, competition produces incentives for nations to subsidize
their own industries, even though those subsidies leave most nations
and multinational corporations worse off in the end-a classic
prisoner's dilemma problem.' 7-5 According to dominant economic
theory, therefore, international cooperation and regulation is
necessary to ensure "fair competition" and "free" trade.176
Taking seriously Fineman's analysis of caretaking labor as a hidden
subsidy, perhaps we should re-orient the IMF, WTO, and other
international institutions so that they work to prevent nations from
pursuing economic gain through a destructive competition to
increase subsidies from caretakers. That is, social welfare cuts could
be viewed as anticompetitive "dumping" or unfair protectionism in
violation of free trade policy. "Anti-dumping" provisions in
international "free trade" agreements address the problem that
government subsidies or protections may allow exporters to increase
market share and to undermine foreign competitors by selling
products at prices below "normal value."177 Following this reasoning,
the unpaid labor of caretakers can be viewed as a subsidy to local
producers who may then offer exports in foreign markets below
"normal value"-thereby pressuring competitors to similarly seek
political and economic environments that shift costs to caretakers.
Current economic orthodoxy makes such an argument seem far-
fetched, but that shows the importance of Fineman's call to open a
discussion about the gendered values implicit in the failure to
recognize the social and economic value of dependent care.
IV. DEPENDENCE ON WHOM?
The revival of rhetoric stressing the virtues of independence ' 7 in
174. See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KosTEcKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GArr TO WTO 20-21 (1995) (explaining the view that the GAIT and
the WTO establish a multilateral trade regime that benefits the world as a whole by
discouraging countries from trade restrictions that might otherwise be in their individual self-
interest).
175. See id at 56-60 & Box 3.1 (giving orthodox explanation of prisoner's dilemma problem
in international trade); see also Gerald Epstein, Power, Profits, and Cooperation, in CREATING A NEW
WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 59, at 39 (giving progressive explanation that corporations will
benefit most if only their country offers protection, but that such a strategy would lead to
competition among countries for protection, making capitalists worse off).
176. EPSTEIN, GRAHAM & NEMBHARD, supra note 59, at 39. The WTO incorporates the
principle of "fair competition," which means governments should not subsidize exports. See
HOEKMAN & KOSTEcKI, supra note 174, at 32.
177. HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 174, at 173.
178. See Clair Mclntire, Welfare Reform Puts People on Payro, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, May 12,
1997, atA7 (noting that "we set the standard for the rest of the country in... breaking the cycle
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fact serves to promote new (or renewed) dependence and control.
Welfare "reform" is one wave in a powerful contemporary movement
to make the state (and its citizens) along with most families (and
their caretakers) increasingly subordinate to-and dependent on-a
"market" structured in the interests of a wealthy minority.'
This movement aims to construct collective support for caretaking
as a major threat to society: the welfare state becomes the pejorative
"nanny state."18° For instance, a Cato Institute report used the tile
"The Advancing Nanny State" to portray child care subsidies as a
great danger to family and market.18 1 An editorial in the Investors'
Business Daily explains that the opposite of the Founder's vision of
civil liberty is "a nanny state with growing bureaucracy, swarms of
regulations, ever-growing taxes and coercive rules to force citizens to
do just what big-government types want."'82
The "nanny state" slur is revealing for how it represents the
nemesis of political and economic autonomy. This term ridicules the
usurpation of a traditional class as well as gender order: it implies
"nannies" are women and domestic servants, not leaders of a "free"
society. This image suggests that making caretaking central to the
state threatens not just to give women authority in state and market,
but to give "servants" authority in those spheres. By insinuating that
"nanny" should be removed from state to home, welfare state critics
evoke an image of a return to a patriarchal estate, where freedom,
responsibility and self-reliance means those who work-whether in
the market or the family-leave the governing to their masters.
The rise of the neoliberal ideology of "efficiency" appears to have
elevated "economics" over politics, "market" over state. While this
ideology imagines a strong state as a stereotypical "nanny"
of dependency by assisting families to achieve self-sufficiency through work"); Deusterberg,
supra note 9, at 51 (explaining that the revitalization of the neoclassical economic paradigm
concords with the Jeffersonian ideal of independent actors as the foundation of American
democracy).
179. For a discussion of corporate-funded organizations that led the media and political
campaign for "welfare reform" in the United States, see JEAN STEFANCiC & RICHARD DELGADO,
No MERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL
AGENDA 82-95 (1996).
180. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bray, Perspective: Which Party Will Capture Sense of Nation's Potential?,
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 14, 1999, at B6 (declaring that "the nanny state... discourages work,
investment and innovation through subsidies for idleness and a growing maze of regulations,
taxes, and laws"); Doug Fisher, Strategies to Oust the Liberals, EDMONTON SUN, Feb. 9, 1999, at C3
(advising Canada's right-wing leaders to stress that "[w] orkfare is progressive, the Nanny State is
not").
181. See Suzanne Fields, Viewpoint: Beware PM Day Care, COMMERCIAL APp., Nov. 2, 1997, at
B6 (favorably discussing the Cato report).
182. Editorial, What the Founders Can Teach Us, INVESTORS Bus. DAiLYJuly 2,1998, atA28.
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infantilizing her charges through excessive control or attachment,183 it
appears to imagine a strong market as a stereotypical "daddy" whose
discipline and distance leads to self-reliant growth. But the
neoliberal movement to make the supposed "free market" master of
state and family is fundamentally about redistributing power within
the market, state and family. "Free market" ideology turns moral
questions of "rights" and "fairness," which should be open to public
debate, into questions of "economic efficiency," relegated to
technical cost-benefit calculation and removed from democratic
control.
1 8 4
Where this economic ideology governs, it is not enough to make
caretaking subsidies fair or right, we must go further to challenge the
rules that make fairness costly and so-called "efficiency" neutral and
necessary. By examining the double standard for public support for
caretaking versus public support for capital and corporate interests,
we can better see how supposed principles of "efficiency" inextricably
depend on moral and political assumptions about the fair
distribution of resources. The question for debate should not be
whether subsidies for caretakers are economically efficient, but for
whom, and according to what standard of economic well-being.
Furthermore, the debate should focus on the institutional
arrangements that threaten to make caretaking subsidies such a costly
choice for most governments. In the guise of promoting "efficiency,"
neoliberal policies are succeeding in redistributing political and
economic power so that corporate and capital subsidies appear to be
an economic necessity in a global market. At the same time, these
policies are establishing structures that make caretaking subsidies
appear to be an unaffordable luxury that most nations must sacrifice
in favor of support for capital interests. But law and politics, not
neutral economics, determines who must accept tough tradeoffs due
to limited resources and who can reject such limits as "inefficient" or
illegal constraints on "free trade," "property rights" or
"competitiveness." ls
183. See Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, Now Cme the Hard Par, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
1998, at R25 (reporting that British Prime Minister Tony Blair admonished opponents of his
"free market" policies to "grow up").
184. See Janine Brodie, supra note 102, at 55-56 (noting that democratic control over
economies has eroded because of neoliberal trade policies and globalization of capital, along
with a discourse in which the "economic" and the "market" are depoliticized); TEEPLE, supra
note 14, at 122-27 (discussing restrictions on democratic processes caused by increasing
preemption of local and national decisionmaking by undemocratic international institutions
like the WVTO and IMF, controlled by capital interests); see also CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 59, at
23 (arguing that developed nations are under a kind of "political trusteeship of finance capital,"
because of a vicious circle of pressure by private banking and financial creditors).
185. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 918-19 (explaining how conventional "efficiency"
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The promise of Fineman's vision should not be clouded by the
difficulty of getting from here to there. Challenging the supposed
"economic" barriers to caretaking subsidies imposed by the dominant
"free market" ideology is a crucial step along the way. By opposing
the neoliberal ideology that is shifting costs to so many, feminists can
open up new possibilities for democracy and fairness that will help
transcend differences of family, race, geography, and gender.
analysis incorporates a double standard whereby constraints on some peoples' interests are
constructed as expendable "market barriers" requiring correction, while constraints on other
peoples' interests are constructed as inevitable market forces requiring acceptance).
